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This study provides the first analysis of the politics and ethics behind carbon taxation 
in South Africa and Mexico. Using the preexisting scholarly frameworks of climate change 
policy, tax policy, and Robert Putnam’s two level games, I determine that in both cases, 
international pressures from multilateral negotiations and international development funding 
sources initiated the carbon tax policymaking process within the environment and treasury 
ministries of both countries. Once environment ministry bureaucrats initiated the carbon tax 
a lack of politicization of climate change (both countries) and an additional gain of raising 
revenue (Mexico) allowed the taxes to become law. 
I then turn to the laws themselves, analyzing their implications for climate justice. In 
both cases, the government did not adopt any proposals made interest groups representing 
environmental concerns and poverty groups, and instead shaped the bills so as to tailor to the 
interests of heavy manufacturing. This policy decision had the main effect of weakening the 
climate change mitigation impact of the carbon tax, and exacerbating issues of regressivity 
by not recycling revenues towards projects aimed at poverty reductions. I conclude this 
paper with an analysis of the ethics of such a carbon tax in developing countries. The carbon 
taxes, as they currently exist, sacrifice the rights and needs of the present poor for those of 
the future generation while an ideal policy that addresses poverty betters the condition of 
both groups. In order to ensure climate justice and for all groups and prevent political 
backlash, policy makers in middle-income countries must make carbon reduction policies 






Politics or an Insider’s Game? 
 
Introduction 
September 2014, hundreds of thousands of activists, from the US and around the 
world, converged on New York City.  Moments of silence for the victims of climate change 
were followed by roars of hope. For nearly nine hours, a stream of bodies marchef from 
Central Park to the headquarters of the UN demanding that political leaders listen not only to 
the science on climate change, but to the real people on the frontline of climate change’s 
negative effects. Events like the People’s climate march underscore the importance politics 
and direct action is believed to have on the outcome of climate change. Visible and 
passionate as they may be, activists are not the only ones advocating for government leaders 
to take action.  Jim Kim, President of the World Bank, once insisted,  “we know that if we 
don't confront climate change, there will be no hope of ending poverty... the longer we delay 
in tackling climate change, the higher the cost will be to do the right thing for our planet and 
for our children.”1  Even though Jim Kim is the leader of the largest and most far-reaching 
International Developmental Organization, one that is making serious efforts to address 
climate change in whatever way he can, his power is limited. When taking a realist approach 
to the issue of climate change, we realize that he is not too different from the 400,000 
marchers in the New York City streets. He is most powerful when he can inspire states to 
take concrete action, and encourage others to follow suit. This task is not as futile as one 
might imagine. Although there are virtually no mechanisms through which significant action 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1  "Transcript of World Bank Group President Jim Yong Kim's Speech and Q&a on Climate Chnage Solution,"  
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on climate change can be forced onto nations, many governments around the world willingly 
and unilaterally pass and implement innovative domestic climate change mitigation policies. 
Almost paradoxically, one of the more widespread climate-oriented policies is also a 
policy considered by some to be the most politically challenging, the carbon tax.2 Even 
though national carbon taxes are relatively widespread, now on the books in 14 states, 
excluding Australia which repealed theirs in 2014, scholars have yet do determine how these 
carbon taxes, considered to be an environmentalist pipe dream in the US, become actual law. 
Most of the countries that passed carbon taxes would be distinguished as high-income, 
global north countries, and most of these reside in Europe, with a few developed nation 
compatriots along the Pacific Rim (Japan, Australia, and Canada’s province of British 
Columbia).  Given the Kyoto Protocol’s approach favoring shared yet differentiated 
responsibility—in which developed and developing countries both have a responsibility to 
address climate change, but most of the burden of mitigation falls on developed countries—
and the general weakness of environmental governance in developing countries, it is 
surprising that the developing, middle-income states of South Africa and Mexico also have 
carbon tax legislation on the books. Thus I began my research with this question, how, can 
the governments of South Africa and Mexico unilaterally pass carbon taxes, a climate policy 
so seemingly progressive and politically impossible? 
This task proved to be difficult as there is no existing literature examining the 
politics of carbon taxes.  To overcome this challenge, I situated my research in fields that are !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Kathryn Harrison, "Introduction: Global Commons, Domestic Decisions," in Global Commons, Domestic 
Decisions, ed. Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom (Cambridge, Massachusets MIT Press, 2010). 7. In a scale including 
different domestic policies that could be taken for climate change mitigation, the carbon tax was considered to 
be the most politically difficult option, beating out public expenditure on international mechanisms and an 
ETS; "State and Trends of Carbon Pricing,"  (Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2014). 15 states have 
passed carbon tax legislation, Australia has repealed its carbon tax, and one Canadian province also has a sub-
national carbon tax. In comparison, the European union, five states, and 11 subnational governments have 
emissions trading scheme legislation on the books 
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well established. There is a wealth of scholarship on related issues such as the politics of 
climate change policies, the politics of taxes, and on the interplay between domestic and 
international pressures that go into policy making. By weaving together insights from these 
literatures with empirical data from carbon taxes passed by middle income states, I found 
evidence that suggested what unique factors enable the expansion of this policy option 
beyond the developed states of the global North. 
 
Climate Change Mitigation Options and Politics 
Initiating a carbon tax, or any climate change-oriented policy, in the absence of 
binding international agreements is in essence a unilateral action. Developing a strong 
climate policy domestically may have significant benefits in the long term, such as gains in 
efficiency and reduced greenhouse gas emissions, but in the short term it may make a 
country’s economy less competitive. Thus, taking on a policy that has the potential to harm 
the domestic economy for the sake of protecting the global commons does not fall within the 
expected behavior of rational actors, unless there are significant gains to be made.  To 
overcome such a barrier, impactful climate legislation generally requires other political 
motives in order to come to pass. In developed countries, distinguished as Annex I in the 
Kyoto protocol, the impetus for action on climate change thus far has not been defined by 
strong activism on the part of the voting majority.3 Rather, domestic action on climate 
change, like instituting a carbon tax, tends to be initiated by committed politicians and small 
green parties acting within proportional electoral systems. With climate policy, it is difficult 
to separate these domestic actions initiated by these actors, from the influence of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 David Held, "Editor's Introduction," in Climate Governance in the Developing World, ed. Charles Roger 
(Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2013). 3. 
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international negotiation. For example, ratification of the Kyoto Protocol is often initiated by 
international negotiation, but eventually must happen at the domestic level with the help of 
domestic interest groups. However, not all international negotiations are able to inspire 
domestic action.4 Politicians within democracies are likely to be swayed by domestic interest 
groups, and those in less democratic situations, might be more influenced by the private 
sector elite and high-level bureaucrats.5  
 Some developing countries, distinguished as non-Annex I countries in the Kyoto 
Protocol, have defied expectations, and are now “taking actions that are comparable to—or 
even more ambitious than—almost anything being done in the industrialized world.”6 South 
Africa and Mexico have, in particular, taken on some very aggressive commitments towards 
emissions reductions, and have extensive, if sometimes inconsistent, portfolios of climate 
change legislation. However, as will be detailed later in the chapters, in neither case was 
there a strong initiative from voters towards action on climate change. Some interest groups, 
such as Mexico’s nationalized energy companies, advocated for participation in Kyoto to 
encourage foreign investing in energy markets through the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM),7 but in terms of unilateral domestic policies, environment ministry bureaucrats in 
both countries, scientists and presidents in Mexico, and NGOs in South Africa that made an 
additional push for action.8  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Harrison, "Introduction: Global Commons, Domestic Decisions."5. 
5 Ibid. 9 
6 Held, "Editor's Introduction." 
7 The Clean Development Mechanism is a flexible mechanism of Kyoto Protocol that serves as a vehicle for 
fostering technology transfer from North to South. It is employed when global North countries (Annex I 
countries) that are unable to achieve their GHG reductions goals invest in carbon-reduction projects in 
developing countries (non-Annex I). The averted emissions in the developing countries as a result of the 
projects are then counted as carbon reductions towards the Annex I country’s GHG reductions. 
8 Simone Pulver, "A Climate Leader? The Politics and Practice of Climate Governance in Mexico," in Climate 
Governance in the Developing World, ed. Charles Rodge David Held, Eva-Maria Nag (Cambridge, UK: Polity 
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For much or the 20th century, the preferred tactic for addressing environmental issues 
falls under the category of “command and control” legislation.9 This regulator approach 
typically mandates the use of certain technologies or sets limits on quantities of pollution. If 
these rules are not followed, then the government will issue punitive fines or other measures. 
Command and control is a broad category, but, “the distinguishing feature of command-and-
control systems… is that compliance is largely an administrative matter, one for which there 
could be an administrative adjudication, and sometimes, ensuing litigation over inevitable 
ambiguities.” 10  Thus, regulated bodies, such as manufacturers, must follow the rules 
described by agencies or legislation, rather than pursuing their own course of action. The 
private sector historically has objected to such a technique, arguing that they know best how 
to make their operations more efficient, certainly better than bureaucrats. Additionally, 
because of the need for such oversight and constant attention to the best technologies, there 
are high costs of compliance, such as the aforementioned adjudication and litigation, to the 
regulators and the regulated. 
Emissions Trading Scheme v. Carbon Tax 
Market solutions came into favor for many environmental issues after a long process 
of trial and error through other types of legislation. Market solutions usually limit pollutants 
by charging or putting a price on the emission of a certain unit of pollution. As the goal of 
climate policy is almost always to reduce the emission of greenhouse gasses (GHG), carbon 
pricing schemes have become a favorite tactic for policymakers and economists to imagine 
the “fairly radical, economy-wide changes necessary to bring annual emissions levels down, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Press, 2013). ; Lesley Masters, "Reaching the Crossroads: The Development of Climate Governance in South 
Africa," ibid. 
9 Shi-Ling Hsu, The Case for a Carbon Tax: Getting Past Our Hang-Ups to Effective Climate Policy 
(Washington, DC: Island Press, 2011). 19  
10 Ibid. 19 
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and eventually stabilize atmospheric levels.”11 When monetizing pollution in order to 
improve environmental outcomes, the government assigns a price or sets a maximum limit 
to something previously free and unlimited (such as pollution of Sulfur Dioxide, SO2).  
One such policy option that was initially popular is an emissions trading scheme 
(ETS), otherwise known as cap and trade. In such schemes, the government issues a limited 
number of pollution allowances to polluters. If a polluter, say a factory, emitted less than the 
allotted maximum, they can sell those excess allowances to factories or other entities that 
emitted more than their limit. In the early 1990s, the US instituted a cap and trade scheme 
for the reduction of SO2 that has been celebrated and credited for the significant reductions 
in SO2 emissions between 1994 and 2006.12 To address the issue of climate change, a 
number of countries and semi-sovereign territories have established ETS marketplaces for 
CO2 emissions.  The largest such market is the European Union (EU) ETS. Switzerland, 
Australia, Kazakhstan, and New Zealand also have their own national ETS. There are a 
number of other ETS within provinces, states, or cities.13 However, these schemes have 
many moving parts, and require significant administrative capacity for the government allot 
appropriate amounts of emissions rights and gather the data necessary to oversee the 
system.14 This can prove to be very difficult.  Even the EU ETS, allocated about 3% more 
carbon allowances than were used from 2005-2006 (the first two years of the program).15 If 
the governments are unable to accurately set appropriate limits, they face the danger of 
making the policy impossible to comply with, or weak because the carbon price is too low.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11  Shi-Ling Hsu, The Case for a Carbon Tax: Getting Past Our Hang-Ups to Effective Climate Policy. 5 
12 Ibid. 20. 
13 "State and Trends of Carbon Pricing." 
14 The Case for a Carbon Tax: Getting Past Our Hang-Ups to Effective Climate Policy. 21 
15 A. Denny Ellerman, "Over-Allocation or Abatement? A Preliminary Analysis of the Eu-Ets Based on the 
2005-06 Emissions Data," Environmental Resource Economics 41 (2008). 
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Carbon taxes, on the other hand, are simply taxes levied based on CO2 emission 
intensity. The tax can be levied at a number of points of sale. For example, the taxes can be 
levied at the “well head” on the producers of hydrocarbon fuels, or they could be placed at 
the point of final sale to the consumer.16 Because of their administrative simplicity in 
comparison the ETS, carbon taxes certainly seem to be much better policy options for states 
with lower administrative capabilities. 
Both ETS and carbon taxes seek to put a price on carbon and require certain 
conditions in order to maximize their emissions reductions potential: 
• Comprehensive coverage of emissions 
• Uniform price on all emissions 
• Stable and predictable emissions prices 
• Emissions prices aligned with environmental damages / climate stabilization 
goals 
• Maximizing fiscal dividend… raising revenues and using those revenues 
productively 
• Carefully designed compensation…for vulnerable households and firms17 
 
Despite their similarities, ETS and carbon tax have some key differences. First, the ETS is a 
quantity instrument, and thus has the advantage of ensuring that emissions will stay at a 
certain level. The ETS also has political advantages. It pleases environmentalists by setting a 
firm, and hopefully declining, cap on pollution and it offers industry a new opportunity to 
make money by selling credits, and allows businesses to avoid government regulation by 
meeting targets through the ETS market.18 However, governments have limited ability to 
control the price within an ETS, which can lead to undervaluation of carbon credits, like in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Sarah Dowdey, "The Logistics of Carbon Tax," How Stuff Works, 
http://science.howstuffworks.com/environmental/green-science/carbon-tax2.htm. 
17 Ian Perry in "State and Trends of Carbon Pricing." 30 
18 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, "Combating Global Climate Change: Why a Carbon Tax Is a Better Response to 
Global Warming Than Cap and Trade," in Stanford Environmental Law Journal, ed. David M. Uhlmann 
(2009). 5.; Jane Andrew, "Carbon Tax: Challenging Neoliberal Solutions to Climate Change," Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting 21 (2010). 614. 
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the EU ETS. 19Additionally, there is considerable risk in establishing an ETS because it 
requires a new, complex, and uncertain governmental infrastructure to manage the new 
market. 
Nonetheless, as compared to ETS, a carbon tax has the benefit for states of setting a 
fixed price and working within the existing tax institutions of a government.20 Additionally, 
states may find that the carbon tax is more flexible in its implementation; it can be set to 
phase in gradually, and the tax rate can be more easily changed if the price is set too low or 
too high.21 Notably for South Africa and Mexico, carbon taxation can still efficiently price 
carbon in situations of energy monopoly. 22 Proponents of carbon taxes as a climate change 
policy option also list: 
• Economic efficiency 
• Flexibility to reduce emissions 
• Constant engagement with polluters by putting a price for every unit of carbon 
emitted 
• Widest breadth of polluters, from individuals to heavy industry 
• Simplicity in determining carbon content of carbon-based fuels 
• Ease with which the carbon tax can be aligned with pre-existing regulatory 
instruments 
• Generation of government revenue  
• Few administrative costs to the regulatory body 
• Ease of international coordination23 
 
As carbon taxes have increased in popularity over the last few years, so has 
scholarship examining them. Although studies of carbon taxes are quite deep in their !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 "Carbon Tax: Challenging Neoliberal Solutions to Climate Change." 612 
20 Ibid. 612.; Hsu, The Case for a Carbon Tax: Getting Past Our Hang-Ups to Effective Climate Policy. 85 
21 Avi-Yonah, "Combating Global Climate Change: Why a Carbon Tax Is a Better Response to Global 
Warming Than Cap and Trade." 7. 
22 Without multiple competing firms, the South African utility provider (and presumably the national Mexican 
electricity company, until the energy reforms of 2014 fully transform the market) would not trade emissions 
allowances and would likely pass on all costs to their customers. Jan van Heerden, "Searching for Triple 
Dividends in South Africa: Fighting Co2 Pollution and Poverty While Promoting Growth," The Energy 
Journal 27, no. 2 (2006); Shantayanan Devarajan, "Tax Policy to Reduce Carbon Emissions in South Africa," 
in Policy Research Working Paper 4933, ed. Delfin S. Go (The World Bank, 2009).  
23 Shi-Ling Hsu, The Case for a Carbon Tax (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2011). 27, 77, 65, 27, 90. 
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consideration of regressivity and effectiveness, there is not much breadth in terms of 
discipline. Primarily economists, bureaucrats, and legislators actually making the policy, 
have focused their gaze on the carbon tax. Meanwhile, political scientists, sociologists, 
ethicists, and others have largely been silent. Scholarship is further limited because the 
majority of carbon taxes are considered and passed in wealthy “global north” countries, thus, 
economic studies tend to assume the conditions of such countries, such as a relatively 
equitable income distribution and virtually no extreme poor (living under $2.00 a day).  
As scholars have pointed out, there are significant drawbacks to the carbon tax. One 
of the obvious drawbacks is the political difficulty of passing such a measure.24 Taxes are 
hard enough to pass, and with an issue as abstract and political as climate change serving as 
the underlying motivator for the tax, a carbon tax is, understandably a difficult pill for 
politicians to swallow. Additionally, because energy is so heavily carbon-based in almost 
every economy of the world, a carbon tax at this point in time is essentially an energy tax. 
An ETS is placed only on industry, which may or may not chose to pass on their added costs 
to the consumer. With a carbon tax, in its most popular form, consumers are directly 
impacted at the point of their energy purchase. Because the poor tend to spend a higher 
proportion of their income on energy than the wealthy, they would spend a higher proportion 
of their income on the carbon tax, making it a regressive policy. Table 1.1 lays out all of the 
aforementioned costs and benefits: 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 Avi-Yonah, "Combating Global Climate Change: Why a Carbon Tax Is a Better Response to Global 
Warming Than Cap and Trade." 7.  
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ETS Carbon Tax 
Characteristics 
Industries are allotted and allowed to trade 
the right to pollute 
Fixed tax based on carbon content is placed 
at the point of sale for hydro carbon fuels 
Quantity instrument Price instrument 
Positives and Negatives 
+ Sets firm quantity of emissions - Quantity uncertain  
- Price uncertain + Price certain 
- Requires new government institutions to 
implement 
+ Can work within existing government 
institutions 
+ Politically palatable  - Politically divisive 
n Directly impacts biggest polluters (who 
may pass costs onto consumers) 
n Regressive impacts (however, the tax may 
have a positive effect on the poor if revenues 
recycled appropriately) 
 - Difficulty in changing emissions quantity + Tax may be changed easily 
 
 
Economists in South Africa have found that a carbon tax, when its revenues are 
handled in a way that maximizes benefits for the poor, could actually have a positive effect 
on the climate, economy, and income distribution. 25  Due to similarities in consumer 
expenditures and results from a study of the ideal level of gasoline taxation in Mexico,26 
evidence suggests that a carbon tax, when revenues are distributed appropriately, would 
likely also achieve the triple dividend of bettering Mexico’s climate change mitigation, GDP 




25 van Heerden, "Searching for Triple Dividends in South Africa: Fighting Co2 Pollution and Poverty While 
Promoting Growth." 
26 Auturo Antón, "Optimal Gasoline Tax in Developing Oil-Producing Countries: The Case of Mexico," 
Energy Policy 67 (2014). 
Table 1.1: Comparison of some characteristics of ETS and Carbon tax. Characteristics deemed 
as positives are denoted with “+,” those deemed as negative are denoted with a “-,” and those 
with uncertain results are denoted with a “n.” 
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Benefits to Governments in Initiating Carbon Taxes 
Governments can also accrue benefits outside of those felt by the economies over 
which they preside. Some of the potential benefits are domestic, such as appeasing 
environmental interest groups and raising revenues. South Africa and Mexico are 
particularly vulnerable to the social and environmental impact of climate change. 
Desertification is a serious risk in both countries and sea level rise threats areas of Mexico 
like the Yucatan. Having a carbon tax perhaps gives these countries more credibility and 
pull at climate summits, allowing them to negotiate agreements that will result in minimal 
environmental, and economic effects for their countries. Further, states may garner 
reputational gains in the international arena, especially developing countries that could 
emerge as climate leaders. Passing a carbon tax allows these countries to demonstrate that 
they are at the “cutting edge” of environmental and climate policy, thus allowing South 
Africa and Mexico to have an advantage over similar countries, such as Brazil, when vying 
for limited funds from international banks.  
 
Tax Reform Politics 
How, then, do developing countries, like South Africa and Mexico, pass tax law? In 
developing countries, an effective tax system is often an indicator of state capacity. Not only 
does it signify that states have the ability to pass fiscal legislation, and then collect taxes 
from all of their citizens, it demonstrates that government funding is not reliant on natural 
resources and the private interests that control them. Taxation culture is also important when 
considering the application of tax policy conceived in one country, and then applied in 
another. “A simple transfer of tax elements from one country to another will not in most 
! 12!
cases be a sensible solution…common elements of western taxation systems [may] not be 
feasible options.”27 As carbon taxes are an import from developed nations, it is reasonable to 
believe that they should have substantial differences in their effects in South Africa and 
Mexico than they do in Japan or the UK. 
South Africa has the highest percentage of tax collection as a percentage of GDP 
among middle-income countries, and is particularly successful in raising revenue from 
progressive types of taxation like corporate taxation and income taxes.28 This can be 
explained by a historically cooperative relationship between white elites and the tax system. 
Under Apartheid Black Africans and South Asians were excluded from social benefits, thus, 
whites could be ensured that their racial group would benefit almost exclusively from the 
income raised in these taxes, and the wealthy felt a sense of solidarity towards their poor 
white compatriots that made progressive taxation politically possible.29 However, now that 
the Apartheid government is no longer in power, and the South African government is 
racially diverse, the incentive of white racial solidarity that propelled the initial 
implementation of progressive tax structures forward no longer applies. However, The 
carbon tax is a different kind of tax: it is one on consumer goods. This regressive taxation 
model more reflects the taxation culture in Latin America.  
Middle-income countries in Latin America have lower rate of taxation than all other 
middle-income countries.30 This is largely because of the low levels of direct taxation 
(income and corporate, which tend to be the most progressive forms of taxation.) Rather, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 Birger Nerré, "Tax Culture: A Basic Concept for Tax Politics," Economic Analysis and Policy 38, no. 1 
(2008). 164 
28Jonathan Di John, "The Political Economy of Taxation and Tax Reform in Developing Countries," in 
Research Paper No. 2006/74 (Helsinki, Finland: United Nations University - World Institute for Development 




taxation in Latin America tends to be reliant on indirect, consumer taxes, which are 
regressive taxes.31 In Brazil, which can serve as example for Latin American as a whole, 
alliances were made along regional groups. Generally, this had the effect of encouraging 
political polarization and decreasing the opportunities for low-income groups to organize in 
favor of progressive policies. Because regions are extremely unequal in terms of financial 
resources, the strong allegiance decision makers had to their regions did not permit the 
formation of cross-class alliances that encouraged wealthy Brazilians to acquiesce their 
income to the federal state.32 Tax reform in Latin America is most likely to come about if 
specifically required by the IMF, and then by other conditions ranked by likelihood of 
contribution to tax reform: high inflation, elected somewhat authoritarian governments, 
established democratic systems with closed list proportional representation, and a non-
polarized, multiparty system.33  
Remarkably, Mexico has an even lower tax burden than Brazil, and has the lowest in 
the OECD.34 One of the explanations may be that, Mexico, unlike other middle to high-
income countries had, until very recently, a nationalized oil industry. The national oil 
company, Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex), provided about 30% of the government’s annual 
revenue, thus decreasing the need to for generating revenue through taxation.35 Additionally, 
Mexico has extreme regional heterogeneities, not unlike Brazil, so some of the factors that 
made it impossible for the formation of cross-class racial coalitions, and of coalitions of the 
poor, may have also been in play. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Jonathan Di John, "The Political Economy of Taxation and Tax Reform in Developing Countries.”12-14 
32 Ibid.11 
33 James E. Mahon, "Causes of Tax Reform in Latin America, 1977-95," Latin American Research Review 39, 
no. 1 (2004).23  
34 "Oecd Environmental Performance Reviews: Mexico 2013," Environmental Country Reviews (2013). 




Because a carbon tax is a consumption tax, it fits in with the historical taxation 
culture of Mexico. However, it marks a break from the Apartheid tradition of direct taxation 
in South Africa. The introduction of a carbon tax the aftermath may demonstrate strong links 
between business interests and policymakers, suggesting that taxation culture in South 
Africa may now be more oriented around class unity and be switching towards a more Latin 
American approach. Nonetheless, the data only suggests such a switch, and more 
investigation on taxation culture would be required to make such a claim. 
 
Multi-Level Games 
Although tax policy is generally considered a domestic issue, because the carbon tax 
is at its origins designed to address the global issue of climate change, it is important to 
understand the interplay between domestic politics and international negotiations that may 
have led to the policy. The concept of multilevel games explains that when diplomats and 
heads of states, engage in foreign diplomacy, come to the table with both international 
diplomacy and domestic political goals in mind. As Robert Putnam articulated it: “at the 
national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring governments… and 
politicians seek power by… consolidating these groups. At the international level, national 
governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures while 
minimizing the adverse pressures of foreign developments.”36 Policymakers enacting a 
carbon tax are certainly playing both the international and domestic game.  
When a country that enacts a carbon tax is a developing state, motivations and 
political opportunity are less clear. Such countries, as previously mentioned, have had !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," International 
Organization 42, no. 3 (1988). 434 
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concerns that climate policies in general would hinder their growth by making the energy 
needed for industrialization prohibitively expensive. A carbon tax explicitly aims to make 
energy more expensive, at least those forms of energy that are carbon based. Additionally, in 
developing countries, especially middle-income countries, inequality is a huge concern. Any 
policy with regressive impacts, such as a carbon tax, is not only politically hard to pass, but 
becomes morally questionable.  
 
Ethical Questions 
Because climate change abatement raises significant questions of justice and 
efficacy, especially in relation to differentiating but common responsibilities of developing 
underdeveloped nations to the persons of the future. Thus, the findings of this paper are 
critical for the future of carbon taxes, and, more generally, climate policy in the developing 
world.  Those who will suffer the most from climate change are persons who do not yet 
exist. Thus, every moment of inaction is a disservice to future persons and raises issues of 
intergenerational justice. Yet, climate policy choices may have differential effects on 
citizens alive today, with the poor suffering the most from inaction. We must ask ourselves 
who should bare the burden in the present to ensure the well being of future persons? 
Wealthy, highly developed nations historically have been the greatest emitters of 
carbon, and have contributed the most to the problem because they were able to reach their 
level of development through the huge quantities of carbon emitted during industrialization. 
Using this line of reasoning, developing countries often argue that it is their right to emit 
carbon in order to develop themselves, and that the more highly developed countries have 
the responsibility of lowering their emissions to address climate change. As time has passed, 
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the discourse and reality have changed. China, a middle-income country, now emits more 
carbon each year than any other country in the world. There has been at least a rhetorical 
recognition by such states, especially Brazil, India, China, and South Africa, that they must 
also become part of the solution. Indeed, their cooperation is necessary for the success of 
climate change mitigation. More populous, these countries have the potential to surpass the 
total emissions contributions of wealthy countries, especially if the leaders of these countries 
want their people to achieve the same levels of comfort and prosperity as the average 
European or North American. 
Although the process behind making carbon tax policy was not too different from 
what has happened in more developed countries (mostly initiated by political personalities 
or technocratic elites) making energy more expensive, which is what any carbon pricing 
scheme will do in the short run, is much more problematic in the developing world. 
 
Preview of Findings: 
In the next two chapters, I investigate the circumstances surrounding the passage of 
the carbon taxes in South Africa and Mexico respectively. Both are notable in the lack of 
political conflict surrounding their passage, and the favoring of business interests of over 
environmental and humanitarian NGO interests. 
South Africa 
In South Africa, the process that led to the passage of a carbon tax was very slow and 
deliberate. The Treasury Ministry first introduced the possibility of a carbon tax in a policy 
paper published in 2010. Since then, plans and elaborations of that policy paper have 
appeared and been passed into law through the annual treasury bills. The date of 
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implementation has been pushed back three times from 2014, to 2015, to 2016. The final bill 
has yet to be passed (it is planned to be introduced later in 2015). Interest groups were not 
influential in getting the carbon tax to become policy, but they offered input in the forms of 
pubic submissions to the treasury and of lobbying. In the end, NGO concerns about the 
carbon reducing efficacy of the carbon tax, and the effects of the carbon tax on the poor 
were not incorporated into the law. Instead, the tax was altered in a way that would protect 
the interests of large business, particularly heavy industry. South Africa’s participation in 
international climate change negotiations, their role as host for the Conference of Parties 
(COP) 17 negotiations in Durban, seems to have initate the ministerial interest in carbon 
taxes. This interest eventually had enough momentum to bring the carbon tax into law.  
Mexico 
 Because Mexico’s carbon tax was passed as part of a huge treasury reform package 
initiated by President Enrique Peña Nieto, in the eyes of political opponents and the press, it  
was considered to not just be a climate change measure, but also a revenue-raising measure 
as well. As in South Africa, there was little engagement of interest groups advocating for a 
carbon tax before the proposal was introduced. Unlike South Africa, the carbon tax was 
introduced (October 2013) only two months before it became law (December 2013). Thus, 
the amount of influence interest groups had over the final legislation was very limited. 
However, what is abundantly clear is that all the changes benefit large, energy intensive 
manufacturers, limit the carbon tax’s ability to reduce carbon emissions, and do nothing to 
help middle class or poor Mexicans. 
Questions, Addressed and Lingering 
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I formed my questions around the previously mentioned fields, asking in each case: 
to what extent was the carbon tax a climate change or a fiscal measure? and, what kinds of 
multilevel games, or political gains, were at play? In order to investigate the first question, 
carbon reducing policy, tax raising policy or both, I looked at the discourse surrounding the 
carbon tax, mostly as articulated by government officials and the press. Of course, official 
statements and interpretations of these statements by the press don’t tell the whole story. 
Analysis of the text of the actual carbon tax laws, and the legislative packages that included 
them provided a more illustrative example. In the South Africa case, the carbon tax seems to 
have been a purely climate-oriented policy and was not passed with the explicit purpose of 
raising revenues. In contrast, Mexico’s carbon tax most definitely had a dual purpose of 
strengthening Mexico’s climate change policy portfolio, and of raising revenues for the 
government.   
 To deconstruct the political pressures, I investigated the public statements and 
official positions of influential actors such as political parties, bureaucracies, business 
interest groups, and NGOs. I then investigated the international interests at play, looking at 
how different waves of climate policy, and the carbon tax timeline, advanced in comparison 
with the waves of international climate negotiation, and the potential financial gains that 
could be had through improved access to international development funds. It became clear 
that bureaucrats and technocrats—with interests in demonstrating to the international 
community Mexican and South African commitment to climate change—not domestic 
interest groups, initiated the carbon tax legislative process. 
What is perhaps most remarkable, and even most alarming, is the entire lack of 
politics. Carbon taxes in South Africa and Mexico were not initiated with the roar of civil 
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action, or hotly publicly debated. Thus, only the most influential interest groups, those 
representing large businesses, had any say in shaping policy after the bill’s initial proposal. 
NGOs or interest groups representing the poor and disadvantaged either did not participate 
in the debate, or were disregarded. Because of the asymmetry in impact, the carbon taxes 
that were passed shelter heavy industry from the main effects of the carbon tax, and leave 
the average consumer still exposed to the costs. Because carbon taxes are regressive, these 
findings raise unique ethical questions.  
As will be elaborated in my final chapter, most literature on the ethics of climate 
change takes a panoptic gaze of the problem, emphatically urging action on climate change 
for the sake of future generations. However, it usually skirts around issues facing the 
conflict between the present poor and future persons. Economists have demonstrated that in 
the South African, and likely Mexican contexts, there is a way to ensure  a carbon tax yields 
carbon emissions reductions (addressing the rights of future generations to have a livable 
climate) and to also use those revenues in order to have a net benefit for the present 
impoverished. Unfortunately, neither South Africa nor Mexico adopted such a policy route. I 
close, posing questions about the fairness of sacrificing today’s poor, people in these 
contexts who have been historically oppressed by colonialism and racism, for the benefit of 







South Africa’s not so Political Carbon Tax 
 
Introduction 
Since 2010, the South African government has publicly considered a carbon tax, yet 
the date of implementation has moved ever farther into the future. South Africa is not an oil-
producing state, but it is almost entirely dependent on fossil fuels, particularly on high-
carbon coal for its energy consumption (Figure 2.1). South Africa ranks as the 14th highest 
carbon emitter in the world. As the 26th largest economy, the South African economy has he 
24th highest carbon intensity of any in the world.37 In comparison, Mexico ranks as the 111th 
most carbon intensive out of 202 states, and the US is the 128th most carbon intensive 
economy.38 This high ranking is largely due to South Africa’s consumption of coal. Not only 
does it supply 72% of the country’s energy needs,39 South Africa also uses 90% of the coal 
of the entire continent.40 In 1998, 95% of the energy mix came from fossil fuels, with 70% 
from coal and 25% from crude oil.41 Despite South Africa’s commitments made at the 
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37"Each Country's Share of Co2 Emissions," Union of Concerned Scientists, 
http://www.ucsusa.org/global_warming/science_and_impacts/science/each-countrys-share-of-co2.html.  ; 
"Country Comparison:: Gdp (Purchasing Power Parity)," CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html. ; "Carbon Intensity Using Market Exchange Rates (Metric Tons of 
Carbon Dioxide Per Thousand Year 2005 Us Dollars," ed. U.S. Energy Information Administration, 
International Energy Statistics (Washington, DC). 
38 "Carbon Intensity Using Market Exchange Rates (Metric Tons of Carbon Dioxide Per Thousand Year 2005 
Us Dollars." 
39 "South Africa," Energy Information Agency, 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/South_africa/south_africa.pdf. 
40 "Africa in 2013," British Petroleum, http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/Energy-economics/statistical-
review-2014/BP-Statistical-Review-of-World-Energy-2014-Africa-insights.pdf. 
41 Heerden, "Searching for Triple Dividends in South Africa: Fighting Co2 Pollution and Poverty While 
Promoting Growth." 
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UNFCCC Conference of Parties in 2009 to reduce its carbon footprint,42 the economy’s 
dependence on coal for its primary energy source has increased. Thus, it might appear 
surprising that the South African government would have taken such public, and potentially 





Starting with the sub questions articulated in the introduction, is the carbon tax a 
climate initiative or a revenue raising initiative, and to what extend the policymakers were 
playing a two-level game, I analyzed the carbon tax legislation itself and all of the 
accompanying policy proposals, the climate change policy trajectory set by the South 
African Government, the response of scholars to the political economy of a carbon tax, the 
framing of the issue by government officials and the press, the role of domestic political  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 Michael Bamidele Fakoya, "Proposed Tax Policy in South Africa: Learning from the Experience of Other 
Countries and Effect on Consumer Price Index," Environmental Economics 4, no. 4 (2013). The reductions 
goals are for a 34% reduction by 2020 and a 42% reduction by 2025 against a BAU baseline  
43 "South Africa". 





forces, and the influence of international political force over the carbon tax’s birth and 
development. As the evidence will show, the South African National Treasury appears to 
have passed the carbon tax without any intention for raising revenues. In fact, revenues were 
only mentioned in the official government discourse to dismiss concerns that the carbon tax 
was a revenue-raising scheme. The mainstream newspapers never raised the issue. Further, 
the government plans to ring-fence a good portion of the carbon tax revenues to eliminate 
the electricity tax. Thus, there seems to be few domestic gains to be made as the carbon tax 
will not raise revenues, and was not widely requested by civil society before the publication 
of the Treasury’s first official policy paper on the carbon tax. Rather the carbon tax seems to 
be responding only to the international development and climate games from which 
government elites, especially in the Environment and Treasury Ministries, face significant 
pressure. 
The first formal action made by the South African government that demonstrated its 
willingness to institute a carbon tax occurred in 2010 under current president Jacob Zuma. 
The South African Treasury released a policy paper on carbon taxes. This policy paper first 
reviewed the effects climate change would have on the South African environment and 
economy. It then detailed the potential effects on the South African economy, including the 
distributional effects on the poor population. In this proposal, the treasury examined three 
forms which the carbon tax could take: a tax levied directly on GHG emissions; a fossil fuel 
input tax which is a tax on each fuel type, in this case coal, crude oil, and fuel oil, relative to 
its carbon content; or a tax levied on energy outputs acting as a proxy for carbon 
emissions.44 In line with much of the carbon tax literature, the policy paper concluded that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 "Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions: The Carbon Tax Option," ed. South Africa Department of National 
Treasury, Discussion Paper for Public Comment (Pretoria, South Africa2010). 30-31  
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carbon pricing is an important part of a climate change policy, a carbon tax is the most 
appropriate carbon pricing method for South Africa, and that a carbon tax must be 
developed to minimize the effects on the poor through revenue recycling.45  
While a carbon tax was not included as part of the budget the following year, public 
comments on the policy paper were, supposedly, taken into account and synthesized to 
create the carbon tax that was introduced into the 2012 budget with little fanfare or attention 
from media. The 2012 carbon tax proposal within the budget was rather vague, and deferred 
most of the policy details to the publication of a policy paper, scheduled to appear later that 
year, but was not made public until 2013. The 2013 “Carbon Tax Policy Paper” concluded 
that while a tax on measured GHG emissions would be ideal in terms of efficiency, it was 
not administratively feasible.46 Instead, the government stated that they will use a fossil fuel 
input tax, in which the Department of the Environment (DEA) will propose the appropriate 
taxation rates for coal, crude oil, and gasoline based on their carbon content.47 The proposal 
left the date for implementation open, suggesting that it would be implemented 2013 or 
2014. However, the “Carbon Tax Policy Paper” did set some of the guiding principles that 
the carbon tax would follow. Because of the concerns that a carbon tax would cripple South 
Africa’s vital, but energy-intensive industries such as metal production, the 2012 tax was 
introduced with considerable concessions on companies related to their CO2 consumption. 
The proposal laid out the following principles to guide the concessions: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Economy," ed. South Africa Department of National Treasury, Policy Paper for Public Comment (Pretoria, 
South Africa2013). 




• Percentage-based rather than absolute emissions thresholds, below which the tax will 
not be payable 
• A higher tax-free threshold for process emissions,48 with consideration given to the 
limitations of the cement, !iron and steel, aluminum and glass sectors to mitigate 
emissions over the near term; ! 
• Additional relief for trade-exposed sectors; ! 
• The use of offsets by companies to reduce their carbon tax liability; ! 
• Phased implementation. !49 
 
Even in the 2012 budget proposal, the treasury established guidelines on carbon tax 
relief for the first five-year period, including the 60% tax-free allowance for companies and 
additional 10% allowances if a company were particularly vulnerable to the pressures of 
international trade or also creates “process emissions” that result from the manufacture of 
goods such as cement or steel (table 2.1). Below is a table from the South African Treasury 
identifying the tax-free thresholds available to different sectors during the first six-year 
phase of the carbon tax.   
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48 “By-product or fugitive emissions of greenhouse gases from industrial processes. Emissions from fuel 
combustion in industry are included under Fuel Combustion; "Defiitions," United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, http://unfccc.int/ghg_data/online_help/definitions/items/3817.php. 





Another way the South African carbon tax is designed to ease carbon pricing into the 
economy is by the establishment of a phased approach to implementation. The first five-year 
phase, now from 2016 to 2021 per the 2014 carbon tax proposal in the 2014 budget, will 
include all of the aforementioned exemptions. The tax rate is intended to start at 120R 
($10.43 USD) per ton of CO2 and increase by 10% each year until the next five year phase 
(2021-2026) when the treasury will re-asses the rates and exemptions.51 In the most recent 
updates, the government explores the possibility of having companies pay at least part of 
their burden through the purchase of offset credits, however this suggestion will not be 
formalized until the final bill scheduled to pass in 2015. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 "Direct Tax Proposals," ed. National Treasury, 2012 Budget Review (Pretoria, South Africa2012). 186 
51 "How the Proposed Carbon Tax Policy Affect Your Business," The Carbon Report, 
http://www.thecarbonreport.co.za/the-proposed-south-african-carbon-tax/. 
Table 2.1: South African carbon tax exemptions by industry 
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The date for implementation of the carbon tax has been pushed back, first to 2015 in 
the 2013 National Budget, then to 2016 in the 2014 budget. The then treasurer has asserted 
that the Treasury chose to postpone implementation in order to better align the carbon tax 
with existing environmental and energy policy. 
 
Climate Change Policy Trajectory 
Environmental policy, like many things in South Africa, has a complicated history. 
After the end of Apartheid in 1994, the government switched focus from wilderness 
conservation, which had resulted in the displacement of indigenous blacks, to improving 
urban environments and addressing the unequal distribution of the negative externalities. 
However, because of the legacy of Apartheid environmental policies, which favored 
conservation and low air pollution for white settlements by displacing black communities 
and putting unfair environmental burdens on townships, poor groups, especially blacks, tend 
to be skeptical of government-lead environmental initiatives. By and large, they consider 
abstract environmental issues such as conservation and climate change the “preserve of the 
white elite,” and “a priority that was ultimately a threat to economic growth, social stability, 
and poverty alleviation.” 52 Nonetheless, in the past decade, the government’s environmental 
policy focus has expanded to address the issues of climate change.53 This is perhaps for good 
reason. South Africa, like much of Sub-Saharan Africa, is particularly vulnerable to climate 
change, especially drought. Other characteristics such as low resilience due to poverty, high !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52 Zarina Patel, "South Africa's Three Waves of Environememntal Policy: (Mis)Aligning the Goals of 
Sustainable Development, Environmental Justice, and Climate Change " Geography Compass 8, no. 3 (2014). 
171; Masters, "Reaching the Crossroads: The Development of Climate Governance in South Africa."; Peter 
Lund-Thomsen, "Corporate Accountability in South Africa: The Role of Community Movilizing in 
Enviornmental Governance," International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 81, no. 3 
(2005).624-625 
53 Patel, "South Africa's Three Waves of Environememntal Policy: (Mis)Aligning the Goals of Sustainable 
Development, Environmental Justice, and Climate Change ". 171 
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disease burden, poor housing structure, low naturally low and variable rainfall, already 
existing pressure on surface water resources, and reliance on agriculture and fisheries, make 
climate change particularly catastrophic for South Africa. 54  Commercial agriculture, 
especially for cereals and grains, will likely suffer, increasing food prices, and subsistence 
farmers with little access to irrigation will face even more pressure.55 Further, due to the 
effects of climate change on the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, which has arguably worse 
capacity to handle climate stress, addressing climate change may be in South Africa’s 
interest for the sake of regional stability. 
Because the tax does not appear to be a revenue-raising scheme, it more likely falls 
within the climate change policy narrative South Africa has been constructing over the past 
decade. Climate policy in South Africa appears to have come in waves initiated by 
international negotiations.56 Domestic responses to international pressure have been initiated 
by different departments in a somewhat hap-hazard way, creating many of the lofty goals 
and some of the more conservative initiatives, but little coordinated action.57 
South Africa was slow to take up the issue of climate change before the new 
millennium.58 It was not until 2004 that the Department of Environment and Tourism, now 
simply the Department of Environment (DEA), created an initial climate response paper. 
Working with a coalition of varied stakeholders, this initial outline to the government’s 
strategy placed the DEA at the head of the leadership on climate change, but created plans 
for many other segments of the government to be involved, including legislative agendas !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54 "Effects of Climate Change on South Africa," COP17/CMP7, http://www.cop17-cmp7durban.com/en/south-
africa-on-climate-change/effects-of-climate-change-on-south-africa.html. 
55 Jenny Griffin, "Impact of Climate Change on South Africa," Climate Emergency Institute, 
http://www.climateemergencyinstitute.com/cc_s_africa_griffin.html. 
56 Patel, "South Africa's Three Waves of Environememntal Policy: (Mis)Aligning the Goals of Sustainable 
Development, Environmental Justice, and Climate Change ". 170 
57 Masters, "Reaching the Crossroads: The Development of Climate Governance in South Africa." 
58 Ibid. 
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and institutional arrangements such as the White Paper and various renewable energy 
incentives.59 
International treaties and negotiations, not domestic political personalities, however, 
seem to have had the most significant role in pulling climate policy into the national 
agenda.60 To the credit of the South African government, the cabinet commissioned the DEA 
to create a Long Term Mitigation Strategy (2007) which estimated that “business as usual” 
growth, is likely to lead to a quadrupling of carbon emissions by 2050.61 In response to these 
findings, in July 2008, only months before president Mbeke resigned in disgrace, the 
government announced a “peak, plateau, and decline trajectory” plan for greenhouse gas 
emissions, committing to 2020-2025 as the range of dates when carbon emissions should 
peak, followed by 10 or so years of plateau in emissions, and then ultimate decline.62 South 
African delegates elaborated on the previous commitment at the Copenhagen COP-17 
rounds of negotiations in 2009. South Africa committed to an ambitious 34% reductions in 
greenhouse gasses in comparison with a business as usual scenario by 2020, then 42% 
reductions by 2025.  
In 2009, the government called for a national conference of key stakeholders to 
create a plan that would address how South Africa could fulfill its commitments. Although 
the summit resulted in increased dialogue, the resulting paper proved to be insufficient to 
meet the standards of domestic and international interest groups.63 Thus, the DEA released a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
59 Masters, "Reaching the Crossroads: The Development of Climate Governance in South Africa.” 262. 
60 Patel, "South Africa's Three Waves of Environememntal Policy: (Mis)Aligning the Goals of Sustainable 
Development, Environmental Justice, and Climate Change ". 170 
61 Ahaun Vorster, "Mitigating Climate Change through Carbon Pricing: An Emerging Policy Debate in South 
Africa," Climate and Development 3 (2011). 243 
62 Ibid. 244 
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White Paper on climate change, just in time for the 2011 conference of parties in Durban, 
South Africa.  
The impetus for starting a carbon tax was rooted in the recommendations made in the 
2011 Long Term Mitigation Strategy, reflecting what might happen if future international 
negotiations force South Africa to take on binding reductions targets.64 Of all the options to 
prepare the way for low-carbon development, the carbon tax, according to an interview with 
the director of the University of Cape Town Energy Research Center, was an attractive 
option because its affects on GDP and the poor could be easily managed through revenue 
recycling, giving back the revenues to tax payers in targeted tax breaks or government 
programs.65 Thus, the treasury used the recommendations as a foundation, with the hope that 
it could help inspire collective action. Within the South African government “there is an 
appreciation that [their] actions on climate change are not a burden, but are fundamentally in 
South Africa’s own national interest. If [they] don’t act, [they] will struggle to convince 
others like Australia and the US to do so.”66 
 
Political-Economy of a South African Carbon Tax 
 By releasing a policy paper two years before the carbon tax was committed to law, 
the South African government gave scholars ample time to respond to its announcement. 
However, scholarly discourse on a possible carbon tax had been prevalent in South Africa 
long before the government made any formal nod to a carbon tax. The recommendations and 
observations made by scholars in their publications were instrumental in crafting the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!






legislation and informing the dissent of interest groups. Scholarship on this issue was not 
only been important for the development of academic discourse on carbon taxes, but also for 
the shaping of the political context of carbon tax policy in South Africa. 
Equity and Regressivity Concerns 
Jan van Heerden and other scholars at Pretoria University published one of the first 
papers on the possibility of a carbon tax in South Africa in 2006. In his analysis, he found 
that a carbon tax, if revenues were appropriately recycled, could achieve what he called a 
“triple dividend,” a decrease in carbon emissions, an increase in GDP, and a decrease in 
poverty.67 Direct income tax breaks achieved the first two goals with a decrease in emissions 
and an increase in GDP, but not a decrease in poverty. The best option to acheive the triple 
dividend was using the revenues from the carbon tax to reduce the food tax, which is even 
more regressive than a carbon tax.  
Although a carbon tax could be regressive, in the monopolistic energy market, it is 
preferable to an ETS. Other scholarship prior to the publication of the 2010 Policy Paper 
included current chief economist for Africa, Shantayanan Devarajan’s 2009 article on the 
alternatives to a carbon tax.68 While Devarajan found that the carbon tax could have serious 
implications on the unskilled labor market, he also found that carbon taxes, rather than 
emissions trading schemes or proxies through energy taxes, were the most efficient way to 
curb emissions given the monopolistic characteristics of the energy industry. In order to 
mitigate the negative effects of the carbon tax, Devarajan echoed van Heerden’s emphasis 
that welfare consequences of the carbon tax are highly dependent on how the revenue is 
recycled.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
67 van Heerden, "Searching for Triple Dividends in South Africa: Fighting Co2 Pollution and Poverty While 
Promoting Growth." 
68 Devarajan, "Tax Policy to Reduce Carbon Emissions in South Africa." 
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Political Concerns 
After the carbon tax was officially made policy, there was an outburst of publication. 
In this period, scholars, mostly economists, began to raise concerns about the distributional 
issues of the government’s policy proposal, its political roots, and its future political 
implications. Thembani Mbandlayana explored the political motivations behind the carbon 
tax, highlighting the international pressures on South Africa as a leading middle-income 
country and a member of the BRICS group to reduce their emissions and set an example for 
other developing nations.69 This, tied in with the understanding that climate change posed a 
serious threat for their achievement of the millennium goals, painted the picture that the 
carbon tax, and climate policy in general in South Africa, was very top-down driven. 
Mbandlayana then looked at the domestic distributional effects, moving beyond the sheer 
numbers about the regressivity of the tax, but to bring in issues of history. Both 
Mbandlayana and Lesley Masters (2013) discussed how during Apartheid, electricity 
infrastructure directly bypassed poor, black communities, creating great energy inequality 
between urban whites and poor blacks. 70  A carbon tax that does not address the 
distributional concerns thus unleashes more than the ethical concerns of exacerbating 
inequality. It also has strong historical and cultural implications.  
Theresa Alton also looked at the international interests that the government faced to 
institute a carbon tax. As previously mentioned, South Africa has a vested interest in 
international action on climate change because of its environmental vulnerability to 
desertification. Because South Africa’s economy is heavily dependent on exports, there is a 
fear the countries they export to would impose carbon content related tariffs, which would !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
69 Thembani Mbandlanyana, "The Political Economy of Carbon Tax in South Africa," Africa Insight 43, no. 1 
(2013). 
70 Masters, "Reaching the Crossroads: The Development of Climate Governance in South Africa." 
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make South Africa relatively uncompetitive due to the high carbon intensity of South 
African energy. Thus, she concludes, the carbon tax is an important step towards protecting 
competitiveness, and should slowly phase in with a rate that increases over the course of a 
decade.71  
Finally, Michael Bamidele Fakoya in his articles published in 2013 and 2014 very 
strongly denounced the regressivity of the carbon tax, this time from the perspective of the 
domestic political effects of the disproportionate burden of the tax on the poor.72 First, he 
pointed out that the carbon tax, could lead to political riots due to the high price of energy. 
Additionally, with so many people dependent on government grants, he argued that any 
attempt to redistribute the funds to the poor would be likely to be rife with corruption and 
only exacerbate the problem. Fakoya is the only author that articulates the primary 
motivation of the carbon tax as a revenue-raising scheme, and not a greenhouse gas 
emissions reductions policy, concluding with the negative assertion that the positives of the 
carbon tax are only possible, while the negative outcomes are certain. 
The scholarship on the carbon tax in South Africa is diverse,  and it is clear that the 
impact of scholarship on the local policy decisions are complicated. However, issues of 
distribution and income inequality have always been part of the conversation. Some authors 
emphasized negative impacts on industry while others looked at direct negative impacts on 
the poor. Despite these differences it is clear that the carbon tax’s implementation looms 
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closer, the scholarship has grown more wary of a carbon tax and its impact on the South 
African economic structure. 
 
Framing 
 How the carbon tax was framed by government institutions and then perceived by 
the media or public has very important implications for what intentions the government is 
willing to display and what intentions people seem to think the government displays when it 
comes to the carbon tax, and why the tax was politically feasible. Based on media reports 
and outward communications, it seems that revenue generation was not the primary 
motivation for the carbon tax, and that it was a purely climate-focused policy. While public 
opinion is hard to measure, it appears that at least the most powerful citizens are in favor of 
action on climate change, but were not aggressively advocating for its passage.   
Public Opinion 
According to the Pew Global Attitudes Project (GAP), 48% of South Africans 
consider climate change to be a greater global threat than any other issue. Their level of 
concern is below the regional average of 54% believing that climate change is a major 
global threat. Nonetheless, Sub Saharan Africa is a very large region with extreme 
heterogeneities. There are countries, like Uganda, where the Pew GAP found the rate of 
climate change concern to be 66%, and Kenya where 57% believe climate change is a 
serious threat. There are many other countries where the citizenry is more concerned about 
the global threats of Islamic extremists (no doubt influenced by the threats from local violent 
jihadists) such as Nigeria, where 57% were concerned about Islamic extremism, compared 
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to 41% concerned about global climate change, and Senegal, where 67% cited Islamic 
extremism as a threat, and 58% cited climate change.  
Indeed, based on the Pew studies, Africans outside of South Africa are in general, 
more concerned about global threats than South Africans. The top three threats for South 
Africans, climate change, 48%, China’s power and influence, 40%, and international 
financial instability, 34%, are far lower rates of concern than the other top three concerns for 
Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal and Uganda.73 Still, relative to the other rates of concern, it 
appears that South Africans do prioritize the threat that climate change poses, and would 
find government action on climate change permissible.  
This is consistent with the content of the public comments made in reaction to the 
2013 Carbon Tax Policy Paper. More than 50% of respondents agreed that policy action on 
climate change is appropriate, and 94% were sympathetic with the aims of the carbon tax to 
price the negative externalities of carbon emissions.74 Of course, the conclusions one can 
make from these statistics are limited, as the respondents are a very selective group of South 
Africans who had the time and resources to read a government document on the abstract 
idea of carbon taxation and then make online comments about the proposal. 
 Local opinion studies take a more nuanced approach to the issue and show 
awareness of climate change to be much lower than the Pew GAP studies suggest. One 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
73 "Climate Change and Financial Instability Are Seen as Top Global Threats," Pew Research Global Attitudes 
Project, http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/06/24/climate-change-and-financial-instability-seen-as-top-global-
threats/. 
74 "Revenue Trends and Tax Proposals," ed. South Africa Department of the National Treasury, Budget 2014 
(Pretoria, South Africa2014).56 
! 36!
study found that 40% of people from all age groups had either never heard of climate 
change, or knew very little about it.75  
While those who are aware of the issue may feel strongly about climate change, it is 
hard to imagine that there are many such people outside the urban elite in South Africa who 
have access to resources informing them on the threats of climate change, especially the 
threats specific to South Africa. South African opinion on climate change or a carbon tax is 
probably hard to predict because the country is so heterogeneous. However, if the strong 
opinions about climate change are concentrated to the urban elites, in a real politic scenario, 
their opinions probably matter more to policy makers than the rural poor. According to the 
data presented by various sources, it seems that these elites would permit action, making 
them perhaps not advocates for a carbon tax, but certainly not opponents.  
Newspapers 
A review of two of the major newspapers in South Africa further supports the 
hypothesis that the carbon tax is an explicitly environmental and not necessarily revenue 
raising policy initiative. The two newspapers I surveyed for any articles mentioning carbon 
taxation were two of the most popular English language newspapers in South Africa: The 
City Press, aimed at an English-speaking black audience with over 1.76 million readers; and 
The Times, the weekday counterpart of The Sunday Times, the most widely read Sunday 
Paper in South Africa with over 3.4 million readers. Amazingly, over the course of two 
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years, there were only 25 articles that mentioned “carbon tax,” including discussions about 
carbon taxes in other countries.76  
The carbon tax was not a frequent topic of discussion from January 2012 through the 
end of 2013,77 but when it was mentioned, it was frequently painted in a negative light as the 
source of increases in electricity and fuel costs for average customers. There were never 
objections to the government taking action on climate change, or rejections of the science of 
climate change. Instead, in negative framing circumstances, either climate change was never 
mentioned, or the article downplayed the climate mitigation impact of a carbon tax or 
responsibility of South Africa to lead on climate issues. If any justification was given for the 
carbon tax, it was always that the carbon tax was a climate initiative (figure 2.4). Not once 
did these papers mention the potential of the tax to raise revenues for the government.  
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Figure 2.2: Number of articles mentioning “carbon tax” by month published in 
























Figure 2.3: Articles mentioning “carbon tax” in Times and City Press from January 2012-
December 2013 by positive, descriptive, and negative framing around carbon taxes. 
Figure 2.4: Articles mentioning “carbon tax” in Times and City Press from January 2012-




The reception of the carbon tax in media outlets was not so positive (figure 2.3). The 
negative framing reflected some of the concerns of scholars over the carbon tax. However, 
losses of jobs and damages to the competitiveness of energy-intensive industry were less 
central. The articles instead site increases in electricity rates (0.05 R / kwh increase 
according to one article) and fuel prices as the main worry.78 This is in part rooted to the 
distributional issues of a carbon tax anywhere: the poor always pay a higher portion of their 
income on energy than the rich.  
Because 95% of electricity is produced from fossil fuels, and transportation is almost 
entirely carbon based a carbon tax in South Africa is essentially an energy tax with 
regressive outcomes.79 Beyond the obvious equity concerns, there is historical context to the 
dissent. During Apartheid rule, the electricity infrastructure was designed in such a way 
blacks were excluded. Universal and equitable energy production became an important part 
of the post-Apartheid policy.80 
Government documentation and press releases 
President Zuma 
There are no speeches made by Jacob Zuma, or any of his staff, published on the 
website of the office of the president, or his site with the ANC website, that ever mention the 
carbon tax. There are a few of his speeches published on the website for the South African 
Office of International Relations and Cooperation from international climate negotiations in 
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which he mentions the importance of a transition to a low-carbon economy.81 However, the 
most recent of these occurs in December 2010. By that point, South Africa’s treasury had 
only released the initial policy paper on the possibility of a carbon tax. Other domestic 
action on climate change was still limited to the somewhat sporadic legislation and action 
initiated by the Department of the Environment. Not surprisingly, these speeches tend to 
reflect a preference for binding international action, with developed countries taking on the 
brunt of the responsibility. They do not promote South Africa’s unilateral actions. 
The National Development Plan of 2013, released in August 2012, which projects 
policy through 2030, does not state establishing a carbon tax as one of the specific goals of 
the presidency. However, one of the recommendations for addressing the challenges of 
climate change is to have a carbon price “entrenched” into the economy by 2030.82  
Addressing climate change is not articulated as a primary goal of the South African 
government as of 2012 and it is clear that the carbon tax was not a priority of the president. 
Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) 
The Department of Environmental Affairs did not mirror president Zuma’s relative 
silence on the carbon tax. The carbon tax was an important issue for of the DEA for quite 
some time. In 2008, they released a report including a tax on CO2 emissions as a portion of a 
comprehensive market-based climate policy.83 However, the DEA did not make the carbon 
tax part of climate-focused legislation passed in 2010.84 Even though the treasury officially 
official introduced carbon tax legislation, as early as 2010, representatives of the DEA have !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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been lauding South Africa’s consideration of carbon tax policy to international audiences, in 
particular to the COP 16 meeting in Mexico, which preceded COP 17 in Durban.85 
Yet, the DEA has also been an obstacle in implementing the tax. One of the official 
reasons behind the delay of the carbon tax has been the need to coordinate the carbon tax 
with existing environmental policy. The DEA has been involved in this process and released 
a study in 2013 looking to inquiring how the carbon tax, in conjunction with carbon 
budgeting and other DEA climate initiatives, could be used to make a meaningful impact on 
reductions in greenhouse gasses.86 Perhaps in response to these complexities, there have not 
been any online publications from the DEA that explicitly mention the carbon tax since 
2013. The public face of the DEA in terms of the carbon tax may have quieted down, but the 
DEA has been a consistent supporter of climate legislation, and is likely to throw its political 
weight behind a carbon tax, and perhaps even advocate for the tax on multilateral platforms 
in order to invoke international expectations. 
Department of the Treasury: 
As the carbon tax is officially part of Treasury policy, it is not surprising that the 
office of the Treasury has more materials published online that are related to the carbon tax. 
Most of these are informational materials such as press releases, policy papers, and 
presentations from conferences relating to the carbon tax. In virtually all of them, the carbon 
tax is framed solely as a climate change policy. Outside of descriptive documents that list 
revenue generation as only one aspect of the tax, and not a motivator, the revenue generation 
potential of the carbon tax is only raised in the form of public comments and a specific 
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question by a representative to the national assembly.87 The treasury goes so far as to 
explicitly state, in italics, that “the primary objective of implementing to carbon tax is to 
change behavior rather than to raise revenue.”88 Even in the member of parliament’s formal 
question to the Minister of Finance, revenue generation seems incidental to the carbon tax, 
citing calculations of estimated revenue from the proposed carbon tax in the 2010 paper 
written by outside companies, rather than the treasury. While revenue did not appear to be a 
primary motivator as framed by the Department of the Treasury, revenue recycling was a 
common theme. Most of the documents acknowledge the issues of inequity and of decreases 
in competitiveness for South African manufacturers. The usual solutions that are brought to 
the table are revenue recycling in the form or eliminating the electricity levy to address 
issues of poverty, and tax-free thresholds and exemptions for vulnerable industries to 
address issues of competitiveness. 
 In contrast to the DEA’s public presentation of the carbon tax to international 
audiences, the Department of the Treasury takes a much more conservative approach, and 
addresses concerns about the tax’s regressivity. The treasury’s repeated emphasis that the 
tax is not intended to raise revenue perhaps appeases opponents concerned about the equity 
and competitiveness consequences. The treasury certainly appears put more effort into 
addressing issues of manufacturing competitiveness rather than the revenue recycling to 
address income inequality. The Treasury demonstrates their preference for business interests 
through their possible revenue recycling program resulting in the phase-out of the electricity 
tax, with ambiguous effects on the poor, rather than a reduction in a food tax, which would 
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definitely have positive effects on the poor.89 In comparison, descriptions of the tax-free 
thresholds and tax exemptions are very thorough and specific. This shows that the South 
African National Treasury may be more concerned with protecting business and 
competitiveness through the carbon tax than achieving a triple dividend (reducing carbon 
emissions, increasing GDP, and decreasing poverty). Revenue recycling through a food tax 
break can achieve all three, but it is not certain that decreasing the electricity tax and 
providing all of these exemptions will have the same effect.  
 
Political Players 
The political debate in South Africa around the carbon tax has been rather limited. 
Politicians and their parties have been surprisingly quiet about the carbon tax. Opposition 
stances on the carbon tax waver between the concern for the poor and income equality, and 
concern for the health of South African business. Political parties, and businesses lobby 
groups sometimes try to link the two by focusing on businesses as job creators, whereas 
NGOs tend to focus on maximizing carbon reductions efficacy and the ethical issues posed 
by poverty. 
Political Parties 
What appears to be most remarkable about the politics of the carbon tax in South 
Africa is the lack of politics. The African National Congress (ANC) has released no 
statements on their website regarding the carbon tax proposals, which, ironically, were 
introduced by an ANC-run treasury.  Some political sources even state that the ANC is 
against the carbon on the grounds that it is harmful for growth, a position no doubt !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
89 Heerden, "Searching for Triple Dividends in South Africa: Fighting Co2 Pollution and Poverty While 
Promoting Growth." 
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influenced by the powerful coal-mining lobby, manufacturing lobby, and Eskom, the 
electricity monopoly.90 This runs contrary to the early moves the ANC made to champion 
“the development of climate governance.”91 
In contrast, the current leading opposition party, Democratic Alliance, which brands 
itself as a multi-racial party, but is viewed by many South Africans as the “white party,” has 
published two official reactions to the carbon tax proposal. The first, published after the 
release of the 2010 policy paper, was in favor of a carbon tax, so long as it was designed to 
minimize effects on business and the revenues are ring-fenced for environmental initiatives. 
They also used the press release as an opportunity to advocate the break up of Eskom’s 
monopoly over electricity production, ostensibly so that feed-in tariffs for small-scale 
renewable energy could be established.92 However, in 2013, the DA’s tone changed. The DA 
reiterated their stance that they would not support any tax increases for the next three-year 
budget cycle. Part of their rationale for opposing the carbon tax was because Eskom has a 
monopoly. Therefore, the taxes Eskom will pay for the carbon content of the coal they burn 
would be directly passed on to “ordinary South African consumers” who lack energy 
alternatives. The press release reiterates that the monopoly should be dissolved and the 
renewable energy sector be opened as a way to achieve green growth. In the press release, 
they do not deny the need to reduce carbon emissions, but this time supporting the carbon 
tax, which they distinguish as a “punitive incentive.”93  
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The change in the statements’ tone of the also represents a potential change in how 
DA considers the issue of the carbon tax. The first press release was released under the 
office of the DA spokesperson for the environment, making the carbon tax explicitly an 
environmental and perhaps, more appealing issue. The 2013 press release was under the 
office of the DA’s Shadow Minister of Finance. Even though the issue of revenues was not 
brought up once in this statement, the official opinion appeared to be aligning with a broader 
fiscal position, which took precedence over the DA’s position on climate change and green 
growth. Ever since, there has been little public political disagreement about the carbon tax 
since its appearance in the 2013 budget. 
Civil Society & NGOs 
Important Environmental and more general Non Governmental Organizations 
(NGO) such as Genderlinks, Inyaletho, and the Wildlife and environment Society of South 
Africa (WESSA), while vocal about the need for climate justice, have been silent on the 
South African carbon tax policy. Climate change and carbon pricing indeed has not been a 
big portion of the NGO focus. Rather, the environmental issues at the center of most NGO 
work are “campaigns against nuclear energy, the promotion of better waste management, 
monitoring air and water born industrial pollution, [and] the promotion of renewable sources 
of energy” rather than the promotion of carbon taxes. 94  
 Nonetheless, there are several NGOs that have contributed to the discourse on carbon 
taxes. Earthlife Africa, founded in 1988, is South Africa’s oldest environmental activism 
group and is among the NGOs in support of the carbon tax.95 Based on their online press 
releases related to the carbon tax, much of their endorsement stems from the aggressive !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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stance that the organization has taken in advocating for climate governance.96 They were an 
early proponent of carbon taxation, advocating for a “staggered implementation of carbon 
taxation,” with “monies ring-fenced in whole or in part for investment in renewable energy,” 
in a report written with the help of Oxfam in 2009.97 However, their publications became 
more prolific and specific after the release of the 2010 Policy Paper. Earthlife argues that the 
tax should not seek to generate revenue, the treasury should set clear carbon emissions 
limits, and, to ensure Eskom’s and Sasol’s (a large south African chemical company which 
produces liquid fuels and electricity) tax burden are not simply passed onto customers, they 
demand that NERSA (National Energy Regulator of South Africa) and petroleum pricing 
agencies to set cost ceilings that prevent such price hikes for customers. This proposal seems 
to be based more on concerns of the efficacy of the tax than its implications for equity. 
Earthlife advocates for earmarking the revenues in order assist a “just and rapid transition to 
a low-carbon economy,” rather than to explicitly address issues of poverty and inequality. 
However, the treasury has not made any efforts to ring-fence the revenues for any purpose, 
let alone environmental initiatives. 
 The Environmental Monitoring Group (EMG), founded in 1991, is another 
environmental advocacy group, with a focus on “building democratic and fair institutions 
that relate to the use and management of natural resources.” The organization has similar 
values as Earthlife, uniting the causes of “economic and social justice” with 
environmentalism.98  However, unlike their counterparts at Earthlife, EMG in its official 
reaction to the treasury’s 2010 policy paper, acknowledges the regressivness of the carbon !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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tax, recommending “people [be] protected through the support to basic food and public 
transport.”99 In many of their publications, EMG supports the carbon tax and is adamantly 
against the establishment of an ETS system, citing not only concerns about the monopolistic 
nature of the energy market, but also concerns about efficacy, based off of the lack-luster 
performance of the EU ETS.  
 There are also a number of transnational environmental organizations active in South 
Africa. The World Wildlife Foundation (WWF) is one of the most active in South Africa, 
and their actions translated into strong support for the carbon tax. In its 2013 submission in 
response to the continuing carbon tax, the WWF, like Earthlife, advocates for “a stronger 
link between the tax and a low-carbon development strategy”100 The WWF acknowledges 
the equity concerns of a carbon tax, but they argue, like Earthlife and EMG that making 
alternatives to fossil fuels less expensive will ultimately address the issues of economic 
competitiveness and social impact of the carbon tax. 
Oxfam has a broader goal to “create lasting solutions to the injustice of poverty,” and 
their stance on the South African carbon tax has changed since their initial joint paper with 
Earthlife.101 After more details of the carbon tax emerged, Oxfam released its criticisms in its 
larger paper on low carbon development as it relates to inequality and hunger. In order to 
avoid the negative effects of a regressive carbon tax, Oxfam advocated that the revenues be 
recycled in the form of an “equal-per-household” tax rebate so that “those with the least 
responsibility for emissions [the poorest households] would become the biggest 
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beneficiaries.”102 They argue that the redistribution of money from the highest carbon users, 
the wealthy, to the poor would address inequality, and that putting the cash in the pockets of 
the poor in such a manner would also help address hunger.103 Thus, Oxfam advocates for the 
carbon tax, but prefers that the revenues be used to decrease hunger and inequality. 
In summary, except for the joint report by Earthlife and Oxfam, NGOs did not 
advocate for a carbon tax before the treasury released its 2010 policy paper. However, since 
its release, both local and transnational NGOs made substantive comments and suggestions. 
All the organizations surveyed for this paper were supportive of the carbon tax, but support 
was contingent on how revenues from the tax were allocated. While the environmental 
groups tended to focus on using the money for sustainable alternatives to fossil fuel-based 
energy, and Oxfam preferred that the treasury use the money for programs that explicitly 
benefitted the poor. The treasury has not incorporated any of these suggestions into the 
budget. 
Business 
As long as the carbon tax has been committed to law in South Africa, the South 
African Chamber of Commerce (SACCI) which represents 20,000 businesses in a variety of 
sectors, has been opposed to the proposal. In 2012, when the carbon tax was first formally 
introduced into the South African budget, SACCI formally stated that the carbon tax would 
pose a threat to “tax neutrality” for South African businesses.104 They articulated in a 
response to the 2013 budget that “SACCI has been at the forefront of advocating against the 
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proposed carbon tax that would lead to massive job losses and further entrench South 
Africa’s de-industrialization trend.”105 Yet, in their opposition to the carbon tax, the primary 
stated goal in this particular press release was not the repeal of the tax all-together, but its 
delay until 2015.106 Indeed, in 2014, when the treasury further delayed the carbon tax to 
2016, SACCI lauded the treasury because “the delay… shows that the National Treasury 
recognizes the concerns voiced by the Business Community on the job losses in heavy 
industry that a carbon tax will impose.”107 This is hardly a glowing recommendation of the 
carbon tax, but whatever their true preferences may be, SACCI is not outwardly 
communicating any desire to fully repeal the carbon tax.  
Other business lobby groups have also opposed the carbon tax. The Business Unity 
of South Africa (BUSA) also came out against the carbon tax, stating that it would not 
support a carbon tax until an “array of other local and global climate change projects 
materialize.” BUSA is skeptical that the tax will really result in reductions in carbon 
emissions. They see the carbon tax more as a way for the government to raise revenue, a 
potentially troubling concept in a government rife with corruption. However, like SACCI, 
“the bulk of their” objection “argues for exceptions and keeping the option…[of future 
carbon taxation] open.”108 Additionally, many of the suggestions made by BUSA in their 
public comment in response to the department of the treasury’s 2013 Policy Paper were 
eventually incorporated in the 2014 Budget’s carbon tax proposal, such as allowing for 
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businesses to use offsets to decrease their tax burden, and a revenue recycling scheme that 
would “mitigate its impact” on businesses. 
Although few interest groups, with the exception of a few scholars and NGOs, were 
particularly vocal about carbon taxation in South Africa before the treasury presented the 
2010 Policy Paper, several actors were quite vocal in their conditional support for a carbon 
tax. Environmental advocacy organizations such as Earthlife, EMG, and the WWF 
advocated for the use of revenue for either carbon reductions initiatives, or ones that offer 
the poor low-carbon alternatives. Oxfam, a broader developmental organization advocated 
that the revenues of the carbon tax be directly returned to the poor in a tax rebate that is 
equal for all households. Scholars tended to side more with Oxfam that the revenues be 
distributed in a way that decreases inequality, but expressed the need that money to be more 
closely managed by the government; rather than giving a rebate to citizens, scholars would 
prefer the money be used for specific initiatives, such as food tax breaks. 
 
International Influences 
 In this section, I analyze the international level “game” South African policymakers 
played when considering carbon tax legislation. South African climate change policy, as 
previously noted, has been very influenced by international forces and the carbon tax is no 
exception.  
International conferences 
 The timeline of South African domestic policymaking around climate change rather 





 It is impossible to demonstrate that the two are causally linked, however, it appears 
that movement in the international climate talks arena at least pulled South Africa’s climate 
policy along. For the carbon tax specifically, there seems to be strong evidence that hosting 
the climate talks in Durban motivated the DEA and the Treasury to introduce policy. When !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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International Climate 
Momentum 
South Africa Climate 
policy 
South Africa Carbon tax 
progress 
1992: Earth Summit 1993: SA signs UNFCC 
1997: SA ratifies UNFCC 
None 
1998: Kyoto Protocol adopted 1998: White paper on climate 
change 
2002: Signs Kyoto   
2003: integrated energy plan, 
white paper on renewable energy 
2004: national climate change 
response strategy 
2005: Kyoto Protocol enters into 
force; EU ETS established 
2007: long term mitigation 
scenarios; ANC resolution on 
Climate change 2006: CDM opens 
2008: Joint implementation starts 2009: National Climate Change 
and Renewable Energy Summits; 
Copenhagen Committment 
2009: Launch of the adaptation fund 
at Poznan 
2010: Mexico hosts COP, Green 
Climate fund is established 
2010: Climate Change Green 
paper 
2010: First Policy Paper 
published 
2011: South Africa hosts; 
“Momentum for Change” launched 
2011: National Climate Change 
Response White Paper 
2012: Doha and Doha Amendment; 
Mexico Passes Carbon Tax 
2013: Policy paper on emissions 
trading published by treasury 
2012: Carbon tax first formalized 
in SA Budget  
 
2014: US and China Climate deal 
 
 2014: Final date for 
implementation (2016) set 
2015: formal Carbon tax bill to 
be passed later in the year. 
Table 2.2: Timelines of international climate negotiations, unilateral South African 
climate policy, and South African carbon tax policy 
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the duty of hosting was passed on to the South Africans, the DEA Minister, Edna Molewa, 
made the fist public announcement of a carbon tax in the previously mentioned speech at 
Cancun. The president of Mexico at the time had aggressively promoted climate change as a 
keystone of his presidential policies early on; perhaps to not be outdone by the previous 
middle income hosts, the South African DEA announced a carbon tax to demonstrate that 
they too deserve to host the UNFCC and to influence negotiations.110 As the literature 
shows, a carbon tax strikes the balance between ease of administering, and perceived 
effectiveness towards addressing carbon reductions. Thus, it was a good option for a 
substantial, but politically feasible climate policy. It seems very likely that once this first 
interest was made, there was enough momentum for change within the bureaucracy to keep 
the carbon tax on its path to law. Perhaps to highlight their progress, one of the main events 
at the Durban talks was the “Momentum for Change” campaign, which specifically 
highlighted domestic, unilateral action taken to address climate change.111  
 South Africa has a great deal to gain from international climate negotiations, 
especially given their vulnerability to climate change. Strengthening their climate policy 
clout, especially during negotiations the year before Kyoto expired, would have helped 
South Africa leverage the negotiations to achieve their goals as articulated by president 
Zuma, to have developed nations take on more carbon reduction, and to provide financing 
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International Development Funds 
One of the primary drivers behind South Africa’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol 
was the hope that South Africa could gain access to foreign investment through the CDM 
program. It might seem reasonable that the development of a carbon tax policy might be 
similarly motivated towards attracting funding from IGOs like the World Bank. However, it 
does not appear that climate policy had such an effect. In World Bank website’s overview of 
South African policy on the, there is no mention of climate change or global warming; rather 
the primary concern is the lack of convergence between the poor and the rich in South 
Africa. Still, the plan for state partnership for 2014-2017 listed the second goal of 
“promoting investments through energy, private investments, and environment” after the 
goal of reducing inequality.”112 There was a sharp peak in the World Bank’s lending as of 
2010, peaking at approximately $3 billion USD (Figure 2.5). However, this peak in 2010 is a 
bit misleading. Between 2008 and 2014, global World Bank project funding peaked in 2010 
then steadily decreased plateaued and then rose in 2014 (Figure 2.6).113 Interestingly, there 
was a huge decline in funding in 2011, the year that South Africa hosted COP 17 in Durban. 
This lack of correlation between climate action and World Bank funding seems to indicate 
that the carbon tax was not passed in South Africa with the idea that being a leader for 
African and all developing countries in terms of climate policy in order to make them 
recipients of more IGO funding.  
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Figure 2.5: World Bank financial commitments to South Africa 2008-2012 
Figure 2.6: All IBRD and IDA World Bank financial commitments from 2008-
2014 
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Although there does not appear to be a link between World Bank loans and climate 
action, South Africa may be positioning itself to specifically receive “climate” related funds. 
For example, during the COP 16 negotiations in 2010, hosted in Cancún, the Kyoto and 
UNFCC parties formed the “green climate fund” with the purpose of financing climate-
sensitive projects in the developing world.116 Increasing money to this fund became one of 
President Zuma’s and Minister Molewa’s primary points of emphasis during their speeches 
to the assembly at Durban. They had a vested interest in ensuring they receive these funds, 
especially since the CDM and the World Bank’s contribution to South Africa had been 
inconsistent.117 By passing a carbon tax, South Africa now maintains its status as one of the 
leaders on climate change mitigation of the developing world, and thus, a leading candidate 
to be worthy of funds from the Green Climate Fund. However, the Green Climate Fund is 
still relatively small. Contributions are dependent on the commitments of high-income 
countries and have recently reached $10 billion USD. There is hope that these funds may 
increase; the UNFCCC set the ambitious goal of growing the fund by $100 billion each year 
by 2020.118 Unsurprisingly, how much goes into the green global fund is dependent on how 
the rounds of negotiations go leading up to Paris 2015. For example, the fund is much more 
likely to grow $100 billion a year if there are mandatory rates of giving from developed 
countries.119 If South Africa, and Mexico, for that matter, gain influence in the COP, they 
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can help negotiate such a requirement that would eventually lead to more financing for 
energy projects.  
 
Conclusions 
My analysis demonstrates some surprising findings: the South African carbon tax 
appears to be only a climate policy and not a revenue raising policy; it did not respond to 
domestic interests, but rather international pressures on the bureaucracy; and in the process 
of forming the carbon tax, concerns form NGOs about environmental efficacy and income 
inequality were ignored in favor of business community concerns about competitiveness. 
Revenue generation clearly does not seem to be a motivator for the carbon tax, as the current 
plan is to recycle the revenue out through elimination of the electricity tax, and to give large 
exemptions to companies that would have contributed a huge proportion of the revenues the 
carbon tax would theoretically have raised. The initial introduction of South African carbon 
tax did not respond to any national policy interest, but rather to the pull of international 
influences. Thus, Putnam’s two-level game, as he described it, does not explain the 
motivations behind the passage of the carbon tax. Legislators and bureaucrats more or less 
disregarded the primary concerns raised by NGOs and scholars alike, when they finalized 
the details of the tax. Decreasing the electricity tax may indeed help the situation of the 
moderately poor with access to electricity, but, unlike decreasing the food tax, it also has the 
potential to help businesses by decreasing their costs of production. Additionally, it is hard 
to imagine heavy manufacturers or electricity providers will have much incentive to increase 
energy efficiency and decrease their GHG footprint if they have 60% and 70% tax 
exemptions respectively. 
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This preference for helping business over addressing poverty is problematic. The 
South African government has struggled with issues of corruption and patronage politics, 
and President Zuma is certainly no exception to this pattern. It appears that the South 
African government is making a policy with serious implications for inequality in one of the 
most unequal countries in the world, purely for the sake of international clout. The 
intentions of the policy may be altruistic, and there are clearly ways to make a carbon tax 
have a positive effect on the poor, but as the politics have progressed, it appears that only the 
concerns of powerful industries have been addressed. Saving industry at the expense of the 
poor not only raises ethical questions, but also raises questions about the efficacy of the 
tax’s carbon reductions objectives. A poor taxi driver who does not receive the same tax 
exemption thresholds is certainly emitting much less carbon than an export-oriented steel 
smelter that would be exempt from about 80% of its tax burden. 
Politics are not perfect. In a democracy, policies have to be altered in ways that are 
not entirely rational in order to be politically possible. Rule by the technocracy has its 
ethical issues and is no way recommended by this study. Rather, what has become clear is 
that when carbon taxes are introduced in areas of the world where inequality and poverty are 
serious issues, they need to be subject to special scrutiny in order to make sure one form of 





A Policy of Dualities: Mexico’s Carbon Tax 
 
Introduction 
As a developing country, Mexico, like South Africa, falls outside the Annex-1 group 
of states distinguished by the Kyoto protocol. Thus, as a non-Annex-1 state, Mexico also has 
no binding requirements to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Additionally, as an oil-
producing state, a carbon tax would appear to go against national economic interests by 
making petroleum-based fuel more expensive. However, on October 30, 2013, the Mexican 
Senate passed a tax on CO2 emissions at the points of importation and sale of the ten most 
common sources of fuel. 
Mexico’s carbon tax was passed rather discreetly; it was buried within an update to 
the Impuesto Especial Sobre Producción y Servicios (IESPS) that included different 
increases on the gas and diesel tax (as a percentage of price, distinct from the carbon tax) 
and new taxes on high calorie foods and drinks. This law originated in 1980 essentially as a 
“sin tax” on alcohol and cigarettes and has since expanded. In 1989, the ISEPES was 
updated to include a tax on gas and diesel as a percentage of their price. This may have been 
influenced by the mounting air pollution in Mexican cities; in 1992, only three years after 
the addition of gas and diesel to the IESPS, the UN declared Mexico city as the most 
polluted city in the world. It is possible, given this context, that the burning of gasoline and 
diesel was considered enough of a “sin” by the Mexican government or public to be taxed. 
The carbon tax is applied at the point of sale to the ten most common fossil fuels 
(excluding natural gas) and covers about 40% of Mexico’s greenhouse gas emissions 
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(GHGs).120 The rate of taxation, roughly $10-50 MXN ($0.74-$3.89 USD) per ton of CO2, 
depending on the fuel type, is relatively low in comparison to the other taxes around the 
world. The tax does somewhat increase in price with the carbon density of fuel with the 
exception of coal and petroleum, which have the highest carbon density of the 10 fossil 
fuels, but the lowest tax rate per ton of fuel. The tax is applied at the point of purchase and 
import, but corporate taxpayers who purchase carbon emissions credits can receive tax 
credits equivalent to an exemption from the tax. 
Even though Mexico has had a fairly ambitious climate legislation record, as will be 
later discussed, the mix of energy consumed in Mexico is very dependent on fossil fuels. As 
of 2012, 53% of their energy needs were met by petroleum, natural gas made up 36% of the 
energy portfolio, and coal 5%. Only the remaining 6% comes from non-hydrocarbon sources 
(Figure 1).121 Given these realities, it is not unlikely that the carbon tax was viewed by as a 
mechanism necessary for meeting the ambitious goals laid out in previous years. 
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To investigate the two questions of the carbon tax as either a climate policy or a 
revenue raising policy, and the role of multi-level games in the policy formation, I follow a 
similar structure as with the south African case with some departure. First, I will summarize 
climate change policy history of Mexico, the recent energy and treasury reforms proposed 
by President Nieto in order to detail the political context of the carbon tax. Next, I will 
describe the process by which the law was changed and eventually passed by the Congress, 
and the influences business may have had on this process. I will also look at the outward 
communications made by the President, the Energy Ministry (SENER), the Treasury 
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Figure 3.1: Mexico’s 2012 energy consumption by type  
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(SHCP) and the Environment Ministry (SEMARNAT) and compare the framing of the tax 
made by these ministries to the framing of the tax in the two most popular newspapers: El  
Universal and Milenio during 2013. Finally, I will look at the impact of the international 
community on the domestic interests and motivations behind implementing a carbon tax. 
In Mexico, there appears to be more political complexity characterized by political 
dualities. The carbon tax was both part of a domestic, unilateral climate change policy 
agenda, with the primary motivation of gaining international legitimacy and placing Mexico 
in a favorable place for global climate policy and other international negotiations, and a 
revenue-raising scheme for the government to fill revenue holes, and demonstrate its fiscal 
responsibility to international audiences.  
 
A Quick History of Climate Change Policy in Mexico 
In order to look at the tax through a climate policy lens, it is important to understand 
Mexico’s policy-making history surrounding climate change. In the first rounds of the Kyoto 
protocol negotiations in 1997, Mexico originally took a role advocating for a non-acting 
status-quo with weak non-binding agreements.123 However, at home, the public opinion on 
climate change was far ahead of the government.  After the adoption of the UNFCCC in 
1992, scientists and environmental bureaucrats from the National University (UNAM), the 
National Ecology Institute (INE), and the Center for Atmospheric Sciences began a push for 
study of climate change, to raise awareness of the issue.124 
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Interestingly, Mexico is not as vulnerable to climate change as some of its neighbors 
and competitor countries. One report ranked Mexico as the least vulnerable of the “plus 
five” countries (China, India, Mexico, Brazil, South Africa) to natural disasters,125 and 
among all nations, Mexico is considered to be at “medium risk in terms of vulnerability to 
natural disaster.126  However, these measures of vulnerability do not include the slow acting 
and sinister trends of desertification and flooding that Mexico is likely to face. The northern 
portion of the country is susceptible to desertification, much like the southwestern US, and 
coastal areas, especially on the Yucatan, are at substantial risk of flooding.127 Mesican 
scientists’ efforts to “an understanding among the elite about what effects climate change 
will have on Mexico”128 were rewarded when Eneresto Zedillo replaced president Carlos 
Salinas in 1994. He immediately appointed Carlos Gay Garcia, the scientist credited with 
leading the push on climate research, as the head of the climate negotiations delegations to 
the UNFCCC. However, until 2000 (the last year of Zedillo’s six year term) when Mexico 
signed the Kyoto protocol, most of the government action on climate change took the form 
of supporting scientific investigation and national studies such as a GHG inventory.129 
During this period before the ratification of the Kyoto protocol by the Mexican 
Senate in 2000, there was a contest of power between Energy Ministry (SENER) and 
Environment Ministry (SEMARNAT) over which ministry would host the Office of Climate 
Change. SENER w sought to protect the interests of the domestic oil industry through weak !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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non-binding action, and SEMERNAT favored more aggressive GHG reductions policy. 
After a dramatic evening in 2000 when the heads of the ministry sat all night with President 
Zedillo, Zedillo assigned the climate change office to SEMARNAT. Placing issues of 
climate change under the control of SEMARNAT likely led to the active outreach to 
business and the Senate that resulted in the successful ratification of the Kyoto Protocol.130 
The Mexican government was primarily motivated to ratify the Kyoto Protocol by 
the promise of participation in the CDM. Because Mexico’s national oil company Pemex is 
infamous for its inefficiency, it lacks the capital it needs to grow and become competitive. 
Thus, Pemex almost paradoxically, was one of the big advocators for joining the Kyoto 
Protocol because “Pemex executives saw the CDM as a way to channel foreign investment 
into company operations.”131 As a reflection of the inefficient state owned monopolies in 
charge of the energy industry, Mexico’s energy costs, especially electricity used by large 
manufacturers, are 80% higher than energy prices in the US.132 Pemex officials and 
politicians alike hoped participation in the CDM would spur international investment in the 
energy sector and eventually make domestic industry more internationally competitive.  
Calderón’s Climate Commitment 
Under the presidency of Filipe Calderón from 2006-2012, Mexico emerged as a 
climate policy leader. Unlike presidents before him who waited until the end of their single 
six-year term to take any action on the issue, he started off his term with an order to draft a 
National Strategy for Climate Change (ENCC) presented to the Congress in May of 2007. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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President Calderón chose to make this a focus of his policy early on because of “personal 
commitment to the issue, and also to gain [international] legitimacy.”133 His administration 
later elaborated on the ENCC in the form of the Special Program on Climate Change 
(PECC) in 2008. Eventually, after the release of a series of non-binding plans for climate 
change mitigation that made the goals in the PECC more specific, the General Law on 
Climate Change was passed in 2012. This law set aggressive, legally binding reductions 
targets: 30% reduction in GHG emissions by 2020 against a business-as-usual scenario; a 
50% reduction by 2050; 35% of electricity generation from renewables by 2024; and lays 
out a cross-bureaucracy framework for the implementation and enforcement of the goals.134 
The institutional scaffolding is intended to “cement an institutional structure for addressing 
[the] climate change challenge via an inter-ministerial commission, [by] establish[ing] 
channels of communication between levels of government, the private sector, and civil 
society, creat[ing] authority to establish a GHG emissions registry and market, set[ting] 
goals to combat desertification, [setting] and goals enhance electricity generation from 
renewable sources.”135  
Neoliberal Nieto 
The election of Filipe Peña Nieto in 2012 had the potential to derail Mexico’s 
commitment to climate change. Because President Nieto was elected under the mandate of 
generating economic growth and a reform of the energy industry that included the expansion 
of drilling and oil exportation, he was not expected to take the executive initiative Calderón !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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had on climate policy.136 Upon entering office, he articulated his main goals for the 
administration in his Pacto Para Mexico (Agreement for Mexico) with the following 
categories: security and justice system reform, focusing on protection of human rights; 
providing social services and protections to fight inequality; increasing quality of public 
education; creating the economic stability and input necessary for equality of opportunities; 
taking global responsibility by promoting national interests in relations with other nations.137 
A year after entering office, his administration did put out his own PECC, but addressing 
climate change was not part of the initial, larger National Development Plan, which 
establishes the administration’s top goals for policy for the six-year term.138 Even though 
Peña Nieto is not as explicit or forward in his commitment to climate change, one could 
argue that he is more likely to accomplish concrete climate goals.139 His PECC is less 
ambitious than Calderón’s, but experts on climate policy in Mexico find his goals to be more 
realistic and more concrete, with suggestions of instruments that are more specific and 
politically feasible, like the carbon tax.140 
  Overall, Mexico has indeed established itself as a climate policy leader, but focus 
has been more on making targets and using markets. Rather than employing command and 
control regulation, there has been a preference to utilize mechanisms that provide “win-
wins” for business and the government (such as the CDM) as a means to reach the 
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government’s GHG emissions goals.141 While there are many players that influenced the 
development of Mexico’s rigorous climate change goals and impressive legislative record, 
executive leadership of the legislature, especially that of Calderón, seems to have been the 
key factor in putting initiatives into law.142 
 
Fiscal Changes Under the Nieto Administration 
As previously mentioned, the primary political platform of president Nieto was one 
of economic growth and development. He was elected in 2012 to promote greater efficiency 
in the government and the economy and fiscally sound polices. The inefficient national oil 
company Pemex and the similarly inefficient and uncompetitive state-owned electricity 
monopoly were obvious issues that needed to be tackled for the economy to groin order to 
achieve those goals.  However, President Nieto is not the first to target the clunky state 
energy monpolies. Under the Calderón administration, his ministers also proposed a reform 
in the energy sector that would allow for private investment and competition in both 
hydrocarbon extraction and electricity generation. Because he was working with a split 
government, at the time (the Congress was held by the historical majority party, PRI, while 
he was a member of PAN the opposition party) the challenge proved to be too much to get 
the reform passed. This gridlock changed when president Nieto (a member of PRI) was 
elected. He was able to work with a coalition of the major parties to pass a package 
containing many of Calderón’s proposed energy reforms in August 2014. Along with the 
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energy reform, President Nieto proposed six other reform packages as part of the legislative 
agenda of his early presidency. The total reform package (the Pacto Para Mexico) is very 
broad, encompassing goals such as financial reform, election reform, regulation of the 
telecommunications sector, anti monopoly legislation, banking reform, education reform, 





Despite the economic benefits of the energy reform, privatizing the oil industry 
creates a problem for the federal government. Pemex has been a major source of revenue for 
the federal government since its founding in 1938, and prior to the reform, funded around 
30% of the federal government’s budget.144 While it will continue to function as an oil firm 
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Figure 3.2: President Nieto’s reform package: “Pacto Para México.” 
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and bring in revenues for the government, its tax burden has decreased, and it will have to 
share the market with competition from the private sector. The reform increases economic 
efficiency in the long run, but means that the government will have to find new ways of 
balancing the budget. 
The tax burden in Mexico is relatively low; at 18% of Mexico’s GDP, the lowest 
among OECD countries (the average is 34%).145 It is hard to imagine that this low taxation 
rate would be sustainable in the context of the energy reform. So, to accompany the energy 
reform, Nieto’s treasury (the SHCP) composed a fiscal reform, which raises direct taxes for 
the rich (going against the traditional taxation culture of Latin America) and in general 
expands the tax base to cover the expenses of the expanding social projects from the 
government while accounting for loss in Pemex revenue. The IESPS updates, including the 
carbon tax, were part of the fiscal reform package passed by the Senate on October 30th, 
2013. 
Although Nieto’s energy reform was largely borrowed from Calderón’s bill that did 
not pass two years before, the fiscal reform was entirely original to the Nieto 
administration.146 The fiscal reform package was truly a huge bill, intended to increase 
taxation by 1.4% of GDP, but what was passed fell slightly short and will increase the 
revenue by 1% of GDP. Not only did it include the taxes on high calorie foods and other 
updates to the sin taxes in the IESPS, but also implemented many other changes in the tax 
code such as eliminating the business flat rate tax, increasing the top taxation limit for 
individuals, unified the value added tax across all regions, and redirecting mining tax 
revenues to local municipalities.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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As demonstrated in 3.2, the carbon tax was essentially buried in a law that made up a 
small part of the fiscal reform package, which was only part of the larger Pacto Para 
Mexico. Passing a carbon tax as only a small part of huge fiscally focused legislation is 
certainly a more subtle way to put the carbon tax into law than by making an independent 
bill around the carbon tax, or adding the carbon tax in a larger climate change package. 
While this does not demonstrate that climate change is a central focus of the administration, 
the discreetness of the tax and its placement in a vital reform package for the president may 
have brought less opposition to the tax than if it were introduced as a stand-alone bill or in 
an environmentally focused package. 
In this context, the carbon tax serves a clear purpose as a revenue-generating policy. 
Because most Mexicans think climate change is a serious issue, as will be later elaborated, it 
is not unreasonable to assume that they think that greenhouse gas emissions should be 
reduced. Of course, there is the issue of most Mexicans not wanting to pay higher prices in 
order to address global warming, but because the tax is a relatively low rate, and broadly 
spread across the population, opposition to a carbon tax would probably be limited in 
comparison with other revenue raising schemes.147 Additionally, because the richer tenths 
(deciles) of the economy do pay larger percentages of the revenue than the poorer 
populations, it gives the appearance of being a progressive tax. However, whether or not this 
tax is progressive is dubious. A tax on gasoline in Mexico is progressive, because the 
poorest Mexicans don’t tend to have cars, but with a general CO2 tax, that may not be the 
case.148 A carbon tax would affect heating, electricity, lighting, and other energy needs that 
poorer Mexicans are more likely to utilize than gasoline for personal transportation. Because !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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94% of energy is carbon-based, and the poor tend to spend a higher percentage of their 
income on energy use than the rich, a carbon tax in Mexico is essentially a broad-based 
energy tax with more adverse effects on the poor. 
Although the changes made by the Congress as the bill was debated significantly 
reduced the carbon tax, and therefore its revenue-raising capabilities, it did raise $1.566 
billion MXN ($105.667 million USD) during the first quarter of 2014, and 80% of those 
revenues will be distributed to the states.149 As a point of comparison, over the same period 
the tax on sugary foods raised $2.336 billion MXN ($156 million in USD) and the Mexican 
government as a whole collected $729.60 billion MXN ($49.25 billion USD) in taxes.150 
This may downplay the revenue-generation hypothesis, but the original carbon tax 
introduced by the Nieto administration had much loftier goals of raising $1.4 billion USD 
over the year. Reductions made by Congress only decreased the revenue-raising capabilities, 
but do not alter the original intent behind introducing the carbon tax. In a situation where the 
government is searching for new sources of revenue, a carbon tax that can be spun as an 
encouragement of responsible behavior, that raises significant, if not astounding revenues, 
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Framing 
 Because the carbon tax is such a specific and technical policy, there were no direct 
polls or representations of public opinion in Mexico, like in South Africa on the carbon tax. 
In order to get an idea of how it was perceived by the public, and compare this perception 
with the message the federal government was trying to get out to the domestic and 
international audience, I again conducted a review of newspaper articles mentioning the 
carbon tax prior its passage, and a review of documents published by the federal government 
in relation to the tax. The official websites of the legislative branches were relatively silent 
on the issue, but the executive branch, especially certain ministries and the office of the 
president, were proud to brandish the carbon tax as an achievement of environmental and 
fiscal policy. 
Public Opinion 
Even though it s hard to gauge what the opinion would be on the carbon tax, the 
Mexican public does appear find climate change to be an issue of importance. According to 
the Pew Global Attitudes study, in 2009, Mexico ranked among the top 10 countries in terms 
of concern for climate change, with 65% of the public considering “global warming to be a 
very serious problem.”151 Additionally, In a poll about major global threats in 2013, global 
climate change ranked the highest of all the issues presented, with 52% agreeing that it was 
a major global threat. The next two threats were international financial security, with 49% 
stating it as a threat, and Iran’s nuclear program, which 39% agreed was a global threat. 
Compared to the opinion in the US, this number is quite high. Only 49% of US respondents 
see climate change as a global threat. However, when compared to other Latin American !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
151 “Global Warming Seen as Major Concern Around the World Less Concern in the US, China, and Russia.” 
Pew Global Attitudes, 2009, http://www.pewglobal.org/2009/12/02/global-warming-seen-as-a-major-problem-
around-the-world-less-concern-in-the-us-china-and-russia/ 
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countries, Mexico’s rate of concern is low. On average, 65% of the region’s respondents are 
concerned with climate change as a global threat, with Brazil topping the list at 76%.152 
However, in the same poll, 61% of Mexicans disagreed with the statement “people should 
pay higher prices to protect the environment.” This stance complicates whether or not the 
Mexican public would be in favor of a carbon tax, as it does make people pay higher prices 
for environmental protection. Thus, it appears unlikely that the carbon tax was initiated to 
appease a strong public opinion preference. Although the numbers may tell conflicting 
stories, they do indicate that the Mexican public is concerned about climate change, and is 
likely to permit government action on the issue, even if they do not actively advocate for it. 
Newspaper 
Of course, media attention is an imperfect measure of public opinion, but it can 
measure public awareness of the issue. The way the media frames an issue, especially one as 
specific and technical as a carbon tax, is crucial to how the public, and the elite will 
understand and form their opinions on the carbon tax. I conducted a review of all articles 
that mentioned carbon taxes in the two most popular papers in Mexico, El Universal and 
Milenio during the calendar year of 2013. In the months preceding the passage of the 
amendments to the IESPS, attention to the issue of carbon taxation did not pick up until 
September of that year, the month the legislation was introduced. Additionally, the articles 
hardly reflect a mandate from the media in favor of a carbon tax. Even though the tax was 
originally presented as an environmental measure, as time approached the vote, coverage 
increasingly represented it as a revenue generation scheme in an increasingly negative light. 
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In this analysis, I marked articles as employing a revenue generating frame that 
either explicitly mentioned the revenues that the tax would generate, mentioned that the tax 
would generate revenues, or categorized the tax as part of the fiscal reform (figure 3.3). Any 
articles that mentioned the carbon tax as a “green tax,” an environmental tax, or an effort to 
reduce climate change were distinguished as environmental framing. Two articles published 
in September of 2013 framed the tax as both environmental and revenue raising them in both 
groups. I did not count another article in October in either category because it did not 
mention any political intentions of the carbon tax. Instead, it focused entirely on the negative 




















Month of 2013 
Revenue Generating
Environmental
Figure 3.3: Framing of carbon taxes as either an environmental policy or revenue 
generation policy in articles from 2013 in El Universal and Milenio. N=40 
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Characterizing the positive, negative, or descriptive stance of the articles was a bit 
more challenging. In general, if the article focused on negative effects, such as loss of jobs 
or higher prices as a result of the carbon tax, or if it was reporting on lobbying or other 
opinions against the carbon tax, I designated it as a “negative” stance. Similarly, if the 
article focused on positive effects of the tax or on the opinions of those in favor of the tax, I 
designated it as positive. Those articles that simply articulated descriptions of the carbon tax 
























Figure 3.4: Positive, negative or descriptive framing of carbon tax legislation in 
articles from 2013 in El Universal and Milenio. 
N= 40 
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From the graphs, it is apparent that before the carbon tax was introduced to Congress 
in September of 2013, the majority of the articles that mentioned carbon taxes focused on a 
carbon tax’s environmental potential, and took a fairly neutral and descriptive stance (figure 
3.3). However, once the legislation was introduced, the total number of articles jumped 
dramatically from near zero a month to 12 in the month September, and 19 in October, and 
then dropping back down to 1-2 a month after the legislation was passed. With this jump in 
attention also came an increase in complexity of analysis. Positive and negative slant articles 
entered the discourse on carbon taxes, as did the framing of a carbon tax as a revenue 






















Figure 3.5: Breakdown of Positive, Negative, and descriptive slants of El Universal and 
Milenio articles from 2013 about carbon taxes by frames (carbon tax as an environmental 
policy and carbon tax as a revenue raising policy) used to describe carbon taxes. 
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Interestingly, nearly all of the articles that presented the carbon tax merely as a 
revenue-generating scheme (not mentioning the environmental motivations) had a negative 
slant (figure 3.5). The environmental articles had much more of a mix of positive, negative, 
and descriptive articles, and all explicitly positive articles written about the carbon tax used 
environmental framing. This could reflect the Mexican public’s general concern about 
climate change. Articles focusing on the negatives of the tax will be more likely to 
emphasize the tax as a revenue generation instrument, rather than environmental action, so 
as to persuade the readers that the negative effects clearly outweigh any positives, which 
they frame only as revenue generation. Additionally, it is not hard to believe that the 
Mexican public is less excited about budget balancing than cutting-edge climate change 
policy. Talking about the carbon tax as a climate change policy will probably draw more 
readers, and necessitates the enumeration of its potential environmental benefits, giving it a 
more neutral, if not positive slant.  
Ministries 
 Because the ministries have played consistently important roles in composing 
climate policy, their outward communications about the carbon tax illuminate the different 
messages the executive branch wanted to send to the national and international audiences 
about the tax. Such outward-facing rhetoric reveals what kinds of political gains the 
bureaucracy, and by extension, the Neito administration may have been pursuing when they 
introduced the tax. 
The environment and the energy ministries were important players in the discourse 
on ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. When president Zedillo gave power to SEMARNAT 
over the Climate Change Office, the involvement of SEMERNAT and the activist scientists 
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working within was critical to the Protocol’s approval in Congress. Additionally, when 
executives have been unable to move action forward in the Congress, action through the 
ministries was key to keeping any climate policy momentum.  For example, Calderón’s 
PAN predecessor, President Fox (2000-2006) was the first non-PRI president elected in over 
70 years, and thus the first Mexican president to work with a split government. Because of 
the political challenges, the most significant climate policy he was able to pass was with the 
help of the treasury, in the form tax incentives for renewable energy.153 Like the carbon tax, 
the incentives were composed by the SHCP before their introduction to the legislature, 
setting a precedent for future involvement of the SHCP in climate policy. Interestingly, the 
SHCP became an advocate for climate policy in part because the World Bank used 
negotiating leverage to encourage the ministry of finance to enact climate-friendly policies. 
Thus, the “SHCP accepted those conditions as minor conditions for access to funds from the 
World Bank.”154 
A review of press releases from the SEMARNAT, SHCP, SENER, and the Ministry 
of Foreign Relations (SRE), which have been the most involved ministries in past climate 
change mitigation policy efforts, reveals little attempts to communicate with the pubic on 
the carbon tax prior to its passage on October 30th 2013. SEMARNAT and SENER did 
release some documents mentioning a carbon tax prior to October 2013, however, these 
were studies conducted by outside institutions. The sole document released by SENER prior 
to the law’s passage was a report composed by the Centro Mario Molina in 2010, detailing 
their recommendations for a route for sustainable growth. The recommendations to the 
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Mexican government, then published by SENER, mentioned a carbon tax as a preferable 
carbon-pricing instrument to an emissions trading scheme.155  
Similarly, SEMARNAT published recommendations all composed by outside 
sources, such as the OECD, which listed a carbon tax as an intermediary step towards 
emissions trading schemes.156 Additionally, in 2009, Academics from the Centro Mario 
Molina and the Ecology Department of UNAM worked with SEMARNAT, the SHCP, 
international organizations such as the World Bank, the government of the UK, and the 
Inter-American Bank for development, to produce a report on the economics of climate 
change in Mexico.157 This document also included a carbon tax as a necessary step in a 
climate change strategy that establishes carbon markets and prices externalities. All of these 
documents frame a carbon tax as a part of a larger climate change policy agenda that 
includes the elimination of fossil fuel subsidies and promotion of renewable energy. The 
revenue-generation aspect of the carbon tax was not mentioned in any of the documents. 
After the legislation passed, all the aforementioned ministries except for the SRE did 
publish online their own documents that mentioned the carbon tax in one capacity or 
another. As one would expect from the environment ministry, SEMARNAT was the most 
prolific of them all, always framing the carbon tax as part of the larger climate change policy 
strategy. The only occasion online documents from SENER mentioned the carbon tax was in 
passing in a report on the future for carbon capture in Mexico. The report framed the carbon 
tax as an environmental initiative companies may wish to avoid paying for through carbon 
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capture.158 Some of the documents published by the SCHP also mentioned the carbon tax as 
a step along their route to low-carbon development. However, most of their documents were 
descriptive spreadsheets, mentioning the carbon tax only in reference to the revenues it had 
raised or was expected to raise. 
The data from the review of online publications by the ministries appears to be 
consistent with observations made by previous authors about the decline of involvement of 
SRE and SENER in climate related policies. Although SEMARNAT was the most vocal on 
the topic, the reform was ultimately a proposal from the treasury and part of the fiscal 
reform. The SHCP may have had more influence over the initial proposal than the 
documents demonstrate.  
Presidential Communications 
Unlike the communications made by the different ministries, speeches and official 
communications made by the office of the president emphasized both the environmental and 
the revenue generation frames for the carbon tax. Nearly all of the speeches mentioning the 
carbon tax were made to international audiences, mostly at different summits relating to 
climate change and other environmental issues. In all of these speeches, the revenue 
generation aspect of the carbon tax was presented as an afterthought, or a positive-side effect 
of the carbon tax’s primary role as a critical piece of the large plan for addressing climate 
change. Nonetheless, when addressing international audiences, President Nieto always made 
sure to remind them that carbon tax is part of the fiscal reform and a larger “global 
agreement” to address climate change. Mentioning the fiscal reform is politically savvy for 
attracting international attention, because it signals to the World bank, IMF, and outside 
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investors that Mexico was abandoning its old and ineffective tax culture by implementing 
more neo-liberal and globalization-friendly structural reforms.  
One of the few times President Nieto explicitly stated the revenue generation aspect 
of the tax, and not just the tax’s position as part of the larger treasury reform, was during a 
panel discussion that was part of a summit on biodiversity loss. He stated,  
The difference between a tax specifically on carbon and a tax on energy is that the 
first has the double objective of reducing emissions and raising revenue, of course, 
the second generally only completes a fiscal objective. A carbon tax is the most 
efficient… way to disincentivize greenhouse gas emissions… to promote the 
viability and development of energy efficiency technologies… [and] the use of 
alternative energy sources.159  
President Nieto here asserts, yes, the carbon tax does achieve a fiscally responsible 
objective, but it also encourages sustainable behavior among its citizens, and will shape 
Mexico’s economy in a way that is climate-responsible. By directly comparing the carbon 
tax with a tax on energy, such as a tax on gasoline as a percentage of its market price, it 
distinguishes the carbon tax from other revenue-generation schemes that don’t have this 
element of responsibility. This framing of the carbon tax maintains that Mexico is following 
up on its climate policy commitments, at least on paper, while also demonstrating that the 
government is more fiscally adept and open to foreign investment. The president’s rhetoric 
use of the carbon tax indicates that Mexico is posturing to engage in the international 
community as a “well-behaved” and powerful developing country. 
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Political Influences on the Carbon Tax Legislation 
 Although the executive branch appears to be the driving force behind all climate 
change policy, including the carbon tax, for it to come into law, it had to go through the 
legislative process. Between its introduction and its passage, the carbon tax underwent 
extreme changes. The influences that shaped it, namely Congressional politics and business 
lobbying, illuminate how the carbon tax eventually was able to come to law in Mexico, and 
why it exists in the form that it does.    
Congress  
When the Mexican treasury introduces taxation law, the law is written in its entirety 
by the treasury and the other ministerial partners, such as SEMARNAT, in relative isolation 
from private interests.160 The initial proposal for the carbon tax was developed by the SHCP 
in conjunction with SEMARNAT and the Mario Molina Center, an important 
environmentally focused think tank named after Mexican Nobel Prize winner who 
discovered that chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) were the source of the Ozone hole. Before the 
tax went to Congress, the tax rate was around $4.79 USD per ton of COs and, as previously 
mentioned, would have raised a total of $1.4 billion dollars.161 However, once it was 
introduced to Congress, industry, NGOs, and any other private interests had access to the tax 
proposal and to Congressional representatives in order to lobby for changes. 
The Mexican Senate is the higher branch of the Congress, and has ultimate voting 





ratifying the Kyoto protocol, the initiative passed unanimously,162 and in 2012, under the 
Calderón administration, the General Law of Climate Change passed with 78 votes in favor, 
two against, and five abstaining.163 The overwhelming majority in favor of the legally 
binding plan is remarkable considering that Calderón was working with a split government.  
Because the carbon tax was buried within the larger reform, opposition votes likely 
do not directly reflect the attitudes of the Senate in relation to the carbon tax. However, in 
the Senate, the reform was passed rather handily, with 73 votes in favor, and 50 against.164 
The vote happened along very strict party lines, with all members of the PRI voting on 
favor, all but one in the PAN against, and then some variety among the smaller parties.165 
Much of the objections to the reform framed it as a neoliberal policy and regressive taxation 
structure that would negatively affect the poor and the economy. Other critics pointed out 
that the fiscal reform was a necessary step to energy reform, which they viewed as 
incongruent with national sovereignty and the governing tradition of Mexico.166 When 
specifically discussing the carbon tax proposal, none of the critiques denied the threat of 
climate change or argued that the government should not act on it. Rather, the focus was that 
the carbon tax itself would be wrong climate policy choice for Mexico. For example, PAN 
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members Sen. Silva Guadalupe Garza Galván released a statement, arguing that 
environmentally sustainable growth is important, but a carbon tax would be fatal to the 
manufacturing industry. She cited how the BRIC nations have far surpassed Mexico in terms 
of industrial output and in general, have become more competitive economically. She points 
out that as a non-Annex I country, Mexico is not obligated to implement policies that 
address climate change, especially actions that would hinder the country’s development. 
Because, as she argues, the carbon tax will so increase energy prices that it will critically 
hinder the growth of manufacturing, she proposes a green “tariff” instead on the imports of 
hydrocarbon fuels instead of a carbon tax, which would have protectionist outcomes.167  
Galván was clearly not the only one of this opinion. Below, figure 3.6 and table 3.1 
demonstrate the differences between the proposed carbon tax and the carbon tax that was 
passed with the fiscal reform utilizing data from SEMARNAT detailing. During the process 
of the crafting and passage of the legislation, the original carbon tax proposed by Peña Nieto 
changed significantly, and became much weaker. 
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Original price per 
ton of CO2  
Final legislation 
tax 
Final price per ton 
of CO2  
% 
Change 






$70.68  $4.79 
 0.00 0  0.00 0 — 
Propane 0.458 0.105 / l $0.01/ l 0.0591/ l 0.01/ l 39.78 2.69 43.7 
Putane 0.458 0.1286 / l $0.01 / l 0.0766 / l 0.01 / l 42.10 2.85 39.7 
Gasoline 
and jet fuel 
0.619 (gas) 




0.710 0.1871 / l 0.01 / l  0.1240 /1 0.01/ l 46.84 3.17 33.7 




0.813 0.2074 / l 0.01 / l 0.1345 0.01 /l 45.84 3.10 35.1 
Oil coke 0.900 189.85/ ton 12.76 / ton 15.60 
1.06 / 
ton 5.81 0.39 91.8 
Coal 0.825 178.33 /ton 12.08 / ton 27.54 
1.85 / 
ton 10.92 0.74 84.6 
169 
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Table 3.1: Changes in taxes as units of sale (liters and tons) and per ton of CO2 emissions. !
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 As the figures show, there was a general decrease in the carbon price from the 
original tax proposal to what was actually passed. The original proposal for carbon tax had a 
uniform price of $70.68 MXN ($4.79 USD) per ton of CO2 while the carbon tax that was 
passed varied considerably in its rates per ton of CO2 depending on the fuel type. For 
example, the price per ton of CO2 for diesel is $46.42 pesos ($3.14 USD) and $5.81 pesos 
per ton of CO2 for oil coke, equivalent to less than one-cent USD.170 The industrial energy 
sources with the highest carbon content, such as oil coke and coal had some of the highest 
rate of discount, lowering the tax for each unit of carbon by 92% and 85% respectively. 
Further, natural gas was exempted from the tax all together.  
The weakening of the tax in Congress may indicate that with the resurgence of the 
PRI party, climate change became less of a priority than what it was during the Calderón 
administration. However, that may not be the case as most PRI members voted for the 
package, and the opposition to the tax articulating concerns came from PAN members, the 
party of President Calderón.  
Business 
Not coincidentally, all of the most discounted fuels, are the fuels of choice used by 
heavy manufacturing.171 This is in part because inexpensive natural gas from the US has 
become the primary fuel for industrial manufacturers and is also the most important fuel for 
electricity generation in Mexico. Additionally, petroleum coke, which is nearly pure carbon, 
is a critical input for the steel and other metal industries. The energy intensive industries 
have been growing at a slower rate than non-energy intensive manufacturing, because of 
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high energy prices in Mexico.172 The carbon tax most impacted the critical inputs for 
industries like cement and steel, and these were exactly the industries that lobbied heaviest 
to change the legislation.173 
The behavior of private interests during the period that the law was in Congress 
(September-October 2014) conflicts with the previous scholarship on the role of business in 
Mexican climate policy. Pulver pointed out that the strongest advocates for climate action 
outside the government had historically been in the private sector. Of course, the private 
sector does not behave as a monolith, and unlike in South Africa, there were businesses that 
publicly advocated for the carbon tax to be passed in its original form. Perhaps the positive 
advocacy was strong enough to prevent the elimination of the tax altogether.   
CESPEDES is a Mexican branch of the World Business Council for Sustainable 
development. Its members include large multinational corporations that have been 
recognized for their sustainability efforts such as Walmart, GE, and Enel Green Power. In 
addition, CESPEDES includes many of Mexico’s largest companies like Bimbo Bread, and 
even Pemex. In 2013 CESPEDES released a long report on the effects that the initial 
proposal of the carbon tax would have on the Mexican economy. The report listed some of 
the drawbacks of the tax. For example, it is too low a rate to change behavior in a 
meaningful way and it will make Mexico economically less competitive. However, the 
report concluded with its official position, in favor of the carbon tax, a list of the positive 
effects of the carbon tax, including its value in helping Mexico establish itself as a leader in 
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climate change negotiations, and the opportunities the tax provides to incentivize an increase 
in efficiency in transportation and electricity production.174 
NGOs 
Civil society is palpably absent from the cast of characters. There are a few reasons 
for this. First, the overall NGO to government policy relationship is still relatively new has 
yet to mature.175 Additionally, in Mexico, party influence, not necessarily engagement of 
citizens through NGOs nor tendencies in public opinion, dominate the national politics.176 
However, even if NGOs or public opinion were influential, it is doubtful that they would 
have mobilized large campaigns around climate change. In Mexico, most environmental 
activists focus on local issues, placing responsibility for acting on climate change with the 
global north countries.177  
A review of online materials posted by top environmental NGOs revealed very little 
mention of carbon taxes in general. Virtually none of the Mexico-based organizations such 
as Pronatura, Espacios Naturales y Desarrollo Sustenable, Fondo Méxicano para la 
Conservación de la Naturaleza (FMCN), Betadiversidad, Naturalia, Organización Mexicana 
para la Conservación del Medio Ambiente, and El Centro de Información y Comunicación 
Ambiental de Norteamérica (CICEANA) have any publications that relate to carbon 
taxation. The only local organization that did publish any opinions on the carbon tax was 
CEMDA (Mexican Center for Environmental Law). They co-authored and posted on their 
website a document by a consortium of organizations, including transnational Greenpeace 
Mexico (this was their only online mention of the carbon tax either) called Red Transición !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
174 “Propuesta de Impuesto al Carbono: Notas Para el Posicionamento de CESPEDES,” CESPEDES, 
September 2013, 12-13. 
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176 Heilen G. Meirovich, “The Politics of Climate In Developing Countries, the Case of Mexico,” 67 
177 Simone Pulver, “Climate Change Politics in Mexico,” 26 
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Energetica (network for energy transition). In this document, published in September 2013, 
the month the fiscal reform package was introduced to the legislature, the Red Transición 
Energetica articulates their preferences for the upcoming fiscal and energy reforms. The 
carbon tax is only mentioned as one of the legislative goals for the energy and fiscal 
reforms, and it is not even on the top of the list.178 
 The transnational organizations of WWF Mexico and Oxfam Mexico did have 
slightly more online activity regarding carbon taxation, but none of the articles offered 
specific opinions on carbon taxation in Mexico. Oxfam Mexico published materials 
regarding carbon taxation, but these were essentially limited to celebrating South Africa’s 
announcement at Durban that they were going to initiate a carbon tax,179 and more generally, 
including carbon taxation in a list of reforms the G20 as a whole should consider during 
their 2012 meeting.180 The WWF also published articles more generally focused on carbon 
taxation, denouncing Australia’s repeal of their carbon tax181 and again recommending a 
carbon pricing mechanism be adopted by members of the G20 2011 meeting.  
However, WWF Mexico, with the assistance of the transnational environmental 
groups, did create a report called CleanTech Mexico.182 This report published in early 2015 
is perhaps the most thorough NGO consideration the carbon tax. The report first lauds the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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existence of a carbon tax and supports it as an economically and environmentally solid 
measure. However, the majority of the statements regarding the tax criticize its current form 
and offer suggestions of how it may be improved. The report laments the variable rate by 
which fuels are taxed, stating while they may be based off of international carbon markets, 
they are not sufficiently high enough to take into account all of the environmental 
externalities of burning carbon. In the report’s final recommendations on how to promote 
the growth of clean technology in Mexico, improving the carbon tax by extending it to cover 
natural gas and turbosine, and using the revenues in order to promote growth in the green 
energy sector was the top priority. This marks the first and only time that an NGO addresses 
the issues of the revenues of the carbon tax. 
Unlike in South Africa, where NGOs actively participated in the debate on the 
implementation of the carbon tax, in Mexico, NGOs publicly said little. Those that did offer 
any official communication on carbon taxation in general rarely acknowledged the actual 
carbon tax proposal. Also unlike South Africa, there was at no point an acknowledgement of 
the regressivity of the carbon tax proposal. Thus the only communication that dealt with the 
carbon tax, one published a year after the implementation of the carbon tax in 2014, 
suggested that the revenues be ring-fenced for development of clean energy. Perhaps 
because Mexicans through the evidence in public opinion polls and the newspaper articles, 
all of the pro-carbon tax articles used environmental framing, tend to view environmental 






Multilateral Climate Talks 
 Unlike South Africa, the relationship between Mexico’s carbon tax and climate 




Mexico Climate policy Mexico Carbon tax 
progress 
1992: Earth Summit 1992: Mex signs UNFCC 
1993: Mobilization by 
scientists 
1995: GHG inventory 
None 
1998: Kyoto Protocol adopted 2000: Mex signs Kyoto 
2002: Climate Change 
office established within 
SEMERNAT  
2005: Kyoto Protocol enters 
into force; EU ETS established 
2006: Filipe Calderón 
assumes office 
2007: Development of 
National Strategy on 
Climate Change (ENCC)  
2006: CDM opens 
2008: Joint implementation 
starts 
2008: Special climate 
Change Programme 
(PECC) sets goals for 50% 
in GHG emissions by 2050 
 
2009: Launch of the adaptation 
fund at Poznan 
2010: Mexico hosts COP 16, 
Green Climate fund is 
established 
2011: South Africa hosts COP 
17; “Momentum for Change” 
launched 
2012: Doha and Doha 
Amendment; Mexico Passes 
Carbon Tax 
2012: Mexico signs Doha 
Amendment; passes 
General Law on Climate 
Change 
2013: Carbon tax proposed 
and signed into law to be 
implemented in 2014 
Table 3.2: Timeline of international climate negotiations, Mexican domestic 
unilateral climate change policy, and Mexican carbon taxation. 
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Rather, as demonstrated by table 3.2, the relationship between the changes in 
administration seems to have a stronger correlation with climate change policy. Early on, 
there was a clear correlation between Mexico’s climate change policymaking and 
international negotiation. However, perhaps once the climate governance ball began to roll, 
policies, especially under Calderón’s administration, policies advanced independently of the 
waves of UNFCC negotiation. It is possible that hosting in Cancún could have provided the 
inspiration necessary for Calderón to pass the General Law on Climate Change and chose to 
sign the Doha Amendment, thus providing the necessary legal foundation upon which a 
carbon tax may be justified. The technocrats in the Centro Mario Molina, and the 
bureaucrats in SEMERNAT were likely inspired by the conference and Calderón’s passion 
for climate change, that this inspiration created policy momentum that manifested itself in 
the carbon tax proposal. 
“Matching” World Bank Funds 
There is very good reason for President Nieto’s advertisement of the carbon tax as 
both a climate change initiative, and a sound fiscal policy. While connections of causation 
are impossible to prove, again unlike South Africa, there appears to be a pattern of 
correlation between Mexico’s leadership on domestic climate action, and benefits it has been 
able to reap from the international system, be it in the form of World Bank loans and 
conditions in international agreements that are favorable to Mexico’s domestic interest.  
World Bank assistance for Mexico peaked at 6 billion dollars in funds during 2010, 
two years after the Calderón administration released their first PECC, and the year that 
Mexico hosted the COP 16 negotiations in Cancún (Figure 7). In 2014, only $395 million 
was committed. By comparison, this amount is at minimum $1 billion short of the 
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anticipated revenues from the original carbon tax proposal.183 However, World Bank funding 
reached its lowest point in 2013, Nieto’s first year in office. During 2013, the World Bank 
provided only $62 million to, a drop from $1.5 billion the previous year. Again, the overall 
funds committed by the World Bank did vary during these years, with overall funding 
reaching its maximum in 2010. Nonetheless, the Mexican fluctuations in funding are much 
more dramatic than the overall trends. It is possible that Nieto realized that he would have to 
step-up the climate change rhetoric if he wanted any chance for the Mexican government to 
receive the amount of money it did during the Calderón administration. It is also possible 
that the carbon tax is a sort of “matching donation;” the Mexican government raises more 
money through a more efficient tax structure that also includes a measure to price carbon 
and address climate change, and the World Bank is more inclined to give them more funds 
for development projects. 
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Figure 3.7: Annual lending from the World Bank to Mexico from 2010-2014. 
 
Figure 3.8: All IBRD and IDA World Bank financial commitment from 2008-2014 
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Like South Africa, Mexico may have also passed the carbon tax with international 
environmental funding in mind. Unlike South Africa, Mexico has had a great success record 
with CDM projects, and was likely instrumental in having the Green Climate Fund initiated 
at the Cancún COP. The carbon tax not only, at least in theory, encourages domestic 
investment in low-carbon forms of energy, but signals to donor institutions and governments 
that Mexico is serious about climate policy and is worth their investment in its energy 
infrastructure. 
Negotiating Leverage in the International Sphere for Domestic Interests   
Climate change mitigation became one of the primary topics of discussion at the G20 
meeting in Brisbane, initiated by the climate deal made between the US and China. Climate 
change may not have been one of the major foci of “Leader’s Communiqué” released at the 
conclusion of the summit, but the document did make strong statements on the need for 
international action on climate. In point 19, the communiqué affirms the countries “will 
work together to adopt successfully a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed 
outcome with legal force under the UNFCCC that is applicable to all parties at the 21st 
Conference of the Parties (COP21) in Paris in 2015.”186 Additionally, the document affirms, 
“support for mobilizing finance for adaptation and mitigation, such as the Green Climate 
Fund.” 187 Perhaps to remind the countries of Mexico’s climate-leader status, at the most 
recent G20 conference, José Antonio Meade, the foreign secretary of Mexico, emphasized 
the efforts that Mexico has taken towards climate change mitigation and its status as a leader 
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185 "Lending Data and Organizaitonal Information." "World Bank Group Committments Rise Sharply in Fy14 
Amid Organizational Change." 




among not just developing economies, but also nations at large.188 This reminder, coupled 
with the assertions of the G20 to work towards a meaningful treaty in 2015 and to support 
the green climate fund indicates that Mexico has a lot to gain from productive negotiations 
and a strong climate fund. With the G20 behind climate change action, mostly as a result of 
the momentous deal between the US and China made the week before, there perhaps is hope 
that Mexico’s investment in becoming the developing world’s and Latin America’s leader 
on climate change policy will yield influence over important international negotiations, and 
thus the benefits of being primary receivers of funds and advantageous terms of an 
international agreement. 
As demonstrated in the discussion on Neito’s outward communications, coming off 
as both climate friendly and fiscally smart is a direct signal to the international community 
that Mexico is a state worthy of influence as “a player in a multi-level negotiation in which 
Mexico uses its membership in selected groups as a bargaining position to get resources 
under the best conditions possible for its development in exchange for specific actions.”189  
Especially because among Latin American countries, Mexico is second to Brazil in terms of 
population and economy size, and has grown much slower than Brazil in the past decade, the 
government has the “desire to be the owner of the climate change topic in the region, and 
thus demonstrating an instance where domestic policy adoption seeks to be consolidated or 
legitimized internationally, which at the same time affects the international climate 
regime.”190 This potential interest is reflected in the Nieto administration’s goal for a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
188 "Meade Kuribreña Participa En Honada ",  El Mexicano (2014), http://www.el-
mexicano.com.mx/informacion/noticias/1/2/nacional/2014/11/16/804003/meade-kuribrena-participa-en-
jornada-final-del-g20. 
189 Heilen G. Meirovich, “The Politics of Climate In Developing Countries, the Case of Mexico,” PhD. Thesis, 
Georgetown University, 2014, 112 
190 ibid, 110 
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“Mexico with global responsibility.”  By passing legally binding legislation on climate 
change in 2012, and in 2013 “following up” by implementing the first carbon tax outside the 
global north, Mexico increases its climate clout and positions itself ahead of the curve if 
climate negotiations end up producing more binding agreements. Already having carbon 
taxation legislation in place in the event an international treaty made carbon pricing 
mandatory, would give Mexico a competitive advantage over other countries because it 
would not have to establish a new law or institutions in order to comply. With their 
potentially increased influence in international negotiations as a result of Mexico’s status as 
a climate and financially responsible middle-income country, Mexico could ensure that 
agreements have stipulations that enhance its strengths and plays to its competitive edge. 
 
Conclusions 
The Mexican carbon tax seems remarkable and unlikely given the status of Mexico 
as a developing, oil-producing, highly fossil fuel dependent economy, especially with the 
election of a president under the mandate of economic growth and liberalization. Of course, 
there was significant resistance, especially on the part of heavy manufacturing, which has 
left the carbon tax essentially impotent in its current form. In the context of the reforms and 
the characteristics of the law, the framing of the carbon tax by domestic government and 
private actors, Mexico’s relationship with the World Bank, and Mexico’s position in the 
international community, there appear to be very rational, non-altruistic motivations. A two-
level game as articulated by Robert Putnam is likely to be in play.191 First, on the domestic 
level, as Pemex shrinks in size and reforms allow for competition in the energy sector, the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
191 Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-Level Games,” 427. 
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government of Mexico is losing a major source of revenue. This combined with the planned 
expansion of services offered by the government creates a need for fiscal reform and 
alternate revenue generation, and a carbon tax falls with in the category of consumer taxes, 
which are built into the region’s taxation culture. The domestic awareness and movement on 
climate change comes into play because it has deemed emissions of greenhouse gasses to be 
a widely accepted negative by the public and the political elite. Thus, emissions of carbon 
dioxide are considered something that negatively impacts the citizens of Mexico like 
alcohol, cigarettes, or sugary foods, making them attractive for governments to tax. Because 
of the influence of heavy industry, the tax is not likely to result in dramatic changes to the 
energy sector. Although tax in its current form is not significant enough to radically affect 
the carbon-dependence of the economy, and like in South Africa, does not address concerns 
of regressivity, it does have symbolic value.  
This symbolic value, while maybe appeasing some activists at home, has a much 
larger impact on international relations. First, it may be sufficient to convince IGOs that the 
Mexican government has proved itself worthy of funds for development projects. 
Additionally, as an upper middle-income country and a member of the G20, In order to win 
the favor of powerful players in the international system, Mexico has to differentiate itself 
from other regional leaders like Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. Taking action on climate 
change has already allowed Mexico to host a major conference in Cancún in 2010. As the 
climate discussion between states becomes more serious, Mexico’s investment in being a 
leader on climate policy, especially among developing countries, has put Mexico into a more 
favorable position among states to negotiate terms more favorable for their domestic 
interests. 
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Although the carbon tax was hardly an altruistic move to re-orient the Mexican 
economy towards a low-carbon model, and may have problematic implications for the poor, 
it does have the potential to be increased to levels that would have an effect on behavior and 
carbon-intensity of the economy. Juan Carlos Belausteguigoitia, the executive director of the 
Centro Mario Molina, stated that he expects the carbon tax to be increased within the next 3-
4 years. Of course, politics are hard to predict, but with the lower oil prices, it is entirely 
possible that the already diminished government revenues from oil rents will further 
decrease over the next few years increasing the need for the government to raise taxes. This 
may or may not be welcome news. If the Mexican government does not take that as an 
opportunity to address issues of equity and regressivity, they will only reinforce the pattern 
of saving the wealthiest, biggest polluters while punishing those who have little agency over 
the carbon intensity of the energy that is so vital to their livelihoods. Further, Mexico as an 
earlier mover has an obligation to set a positive precedent. Carbon taxation has already 
diffused to other Latin American countries. On September 27th 2014, Chile passed its own 
carbon tax law, planned to take effect in 2018. If Mexico sets the example of altering its 
carbon tax in a way that is more effective an equitable, the carbon tax may serve as a 
positive model for the rest of the continent.   
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Chapter 4:  
Equity, Ethics, and a New Climate Justice 
 
Introduction 
Now I return to the fundamental question of this project: what political factors lead 
to the implementation of national carbon taxes, particularly in countries outside the most-
developed nations group? What factors most drew the carbon tax into the government’s 
agenda, allowed its passage, and shaped into the form that these carbon taxes take today? 
What are the consequences of a carbon tax for developing states that still face high levels of 
inequality? Looking at both South Africa and Mexico, a couple of patterns and questions for 
further investigation emerge. 
Overall, it appears that in both South Africa and Mexico, attending and hosting 
international climate change conferences served as the political impetus for carbon taxes. 
The environment ministries, those most invested in producing a good showing of policy at 
these conferences, and those that likely put the most effort into hosting these large 
conferences, may have felt simultaneous pressure and inspiration to deliver on a substantive 
climate change policy that would be relatively easy to implement, such as a carbon tax. Not 
only would this legitimize their role as hosts of climate conferences, but also position these 
countries to be the climate change leaders of their region. These ministries were able to 
maintain momentum for action in South Africa and Mexico despite presidents who, at the 
time of the carbon tax’s passage could be described as neutral towards climate policy. 
The Treasury ministries composed the specifics of the carbon taxes in relative 
isolation of influence from interest groups. Interest groups appear to only have had input on 
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the carbon tax after the treasuries introduced their formal proposals. While the process of 
revision was very different in South Africa and Mexico, both countries were primarily 
influenced by the lobbying of big business, in particular heavy industry. The lobbying, in the 
end, had the final effect of weakening the carbon reducing capacity of the taxes. This is 
particularly problematic in terms of the conditions of economic inequality in these countries. 
As discussed, carbon taxes in countries heavily dependent on fossil fuels for their energy 
mix, such as South Africa and Mexico, are essentially taxes on energy, which are regressive 
taxes.  
Thus, the poor, in particular those who are no longer in abject poverty but still 
struggle with the basics of everyday life, face not only an extra burden, but are limited in 
their ability to move into a level of comfort and stability.  Before we celebrate these policies 
and recommend their adoption in other developing countries, the international community 
and domestic governments alike must consider their priorities of assisting big business, 
ensuring climate policies have the desired effect of decreasing carbon emissions, and the 
already troubling conditions of inequality and poverty that are present in middle-income 
countries.  
 
Observations from the Two Cases 
A-political similarities 
Side-by-side, the political process behind the passage of carbon taxes in South Africa 
and Mexico reveal some interesting patterns and hypotheses to be tested in future studies 
(Table 4.1). First, both of these taxes were primarily framed as environmental measures by 
their advocates, rather than as revenue generating polices. Nonetheless, the taxes were minor 
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elements of large treasury bills, written and initiated by bureaucrats from the environment 
ministries, then adopted by national treasuries and subsequently passed by legislatures. 
Second, carbon tax legislation, or even climate change policy in general, was not initiated by 
civil society activity or advocacy from the private sector. The major parties of both countries 
published little to no information online about the carbon tax, neither did they speak out in 
major media outlets. Rather, experts and elites initiated interest in the issue. This interest 
turned into action and policy within the bureaucracy, eventually forming enough policy 
momentum for the environmental ministries to work a carbon tax into large, important 
treasury packages. Finally, it seems that initial interest in climate change policy and the 
carbon tax, came from international pressures, as the two countries sought the title as the 
climate policy leader of Africa or Latin America. This seems to have only been reinforced 
by the normative pressure of hosting conferences to have strong climate change policies. 
Given the timeline of events, there appears to be a strong correlation between international 
climate negotiations, and the waves of climate policy. International negotiations, and 
promises made at them appear to have lead to commitments that require significant 
legislative support should South Africa or Mexico wish to uphold them.  
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 Mexico Factors South Africa 
Strong Climate Strong 
Strong Revenue Weak 
Medium President Weak 
Weak Political Parties Weak 
Very weak NGO Weak 
Strong Business Strong 
Very Strong Bureaucracy Very Strong 
Strong International Negotiations Very Strong 
 
Both laws have also undergone change since their initial proposal. For South Africa, 
the changes have occurred over the course of five years as a result of input from different 
stakeholders in the form of public comments on policy papers and lobbying. However, in 
both cases, the changes made since the initial proposals have been in favor of the business 
community. In South Africa these changes have mostly taken the form of tax refunds for 
certain industries ranging from 60%-100% exemption. The date of implementation of the 
South African carbon tax has also been pushed back twice. However, in 2015, the treasury 
under a new director, Nhala Nene, did not push the date of implementation back any further, 
and later in 2015, the treasury is expected to release the finalized bill for the national carbon 
tax. Nonetheless, the changes have been much more systematic and purposeful than the 
changes of the carbon tax in Mexico. In the case of Mexico, the changes happened within 
the period of only a couple of months, and ended up yielding a significantly weakened 
Table 4.1: Comparison of political influences in the passage of South Africa’s and 
Mexico’s carbon taxes. 
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carbon tax that does not tax carbon content uniformly, calling into question whether or not 
the carbon tax is indeed a tax on the carbon content of fuels. By reducing the tax rate for 
natural gas to zero, and for coal and petroleum coke to near zero, these reductions favor 
heavy industry and the large businesses that participate in them.  
Contrasting Questions 
Despite all these similarities, there are significant differences between the cases. 
These differences raise more questions for research and discussion. In terms of leadership on 
climate initiatives in Mexico and South Africa have some significant differences. Presidents 
have mostly initiated the Mexican climate change policies, with Filipe Calderón taking on 
the issue more aggressively than any of his predecessors, perhaps creating the space 
President Enrique Peña Nieto needed to pass a carbon tax. In contrast, the South African 
governmental actions on climate change seem to be solely correlated to pressures initiated 
by international climate negotiations. In Mexico, SEMERNAT and environmental experts 
from other institutions also contributed to the trajectory of climate change policy in Mexico 
by taking on the role of constant advocate for action, ready with policy options for when 
there was political will to act.  
South Africa and Mexico also differ in their treatment of revenues. First, the 
policymakers and the media in Mexico are much more open about the revenue generation 
capacity of a carbon tax. This, in a way, makes sense as it is included as part of a large 
treasury overhaul intended to increase government tax revenues as the national oil 
company’s ability to fund the government will decrease with the restructuring of the energy 
market. The Treasury’s plan for the revenues specifically of the carbon tax is quite unclear. 
In contrast, due to the various concerns raised by advocates for the poor and for big 
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business, the South African government has very clearly indicated that the carbon tax is not 
intended to raise revenue, but to increase energy efficiency and reduce carbon emissions. To 
further this end, all the revenues of the tax are to be recycled through an elimination of the 
electricity tax. Of course, there is always an opportunity for corruption, especially if the 
carbon tax’s revenues exceed the revenues of the electricity tax. The rest of the money 
money could, like the Mexican carbon tax revenues, simply disappear into the South African 
budget. 
The respective carbon taxes do appear to fall within the distinct patterns of other 
climate policymaking within their country. Although it is unlikely that President Nieto 
himself initiated the effort to institute a carbon tax, because it was part of a large initiative at 
the center of his campaign promises, it certainly is connected to his office. Additionally, it 
appears that SEMERNAT and the Centro Mario Molino, rather than the treasury, did the 
majority of the work needed to craft the initial proposal for the carbon tax. The frequent 
reference of the carbon tax in international communications made by President Nieto and 
staff from SEMERNAT, in comparison with the lack of attention other politicians or civil 
society gave it, further supports this thesis. 
In contrast, neither Jacob Zuma nor his predecessors seemed to be very concerned 
about domestic climate change policy. Speaking at international climate summits, 
particularly in Durban, Zuma did emphasize the importance of action on the part of more 
developed countries, but did not discuss in specific terms the efforts his own government 
had made towards a low-carbon economy.  Rather, the DEA has appeared to take on the 
biggest role of advocate for climate change efforts as most of the climate change initiatives, 
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including carbon budgets and tax incentives for renewable energy, were designed by the 
DEA, and then implemented by the DEA itself, the treasury, or another relevant ministry. 
In Mexico, perhaps because the carbon tax proposal came a bit more “out of the 
blue,” there was virtually no academic scholarship on the possibility or the reality of a 
carbon tax in Mexico. In contrast, In South Africa, there was a lively academic debate on 
carbon taxes since 2006, four years before the government formally introduced a carbon tax 
proposal. This academic debate, along with advocacy from NGOs acting within South 
Africa, has raised serious questions about the equity concerns of the carbon tax.  
 
Policy Options 
As admirable as is the unilateral action South Africa and Mexico have taken to 
address climate change, the matter is not so simple as it may be in the other countries that 
instituted carbon tax. Because South Africa and Mexico are societies with a different socio-
economic structure from other countries with carbon taxes, one would do well to avoid 
assuming that South Africa and Mexico can proceed forward with a carbon tax in the same 
way their predecessors did (table A.1). Are the tools in the conventional carbon tax policy 
tool belt (putting the revenues in the government budget with no earmarked purpose, 
recycling the revenue through cuts in income tax, using the revenue to decrease employer 
social security contributions, or directing the revenue towards carbon reductions programs) 
sufficient for the needs of middle-income countries? Existing studies on the economics of 
hypothetical carbon taxes in South Africa and Mexico seem to indicate that, for the carbon 
tax to avoid pitting carbon reductions goals against the interest of poorer classes, different 
policy options must be explored. 
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Carbon taxes in any economy will tend to be regressive. They are especially so 
because, in hydrocarbon based energy markets, they become essentially a tax on energy.192 
Energy is required for many basic goods to enter the market, which take up significant 
proportions of income expenditures of the poor. Additionally, as energy is a basic necessity 
itself for lighting, cooking, and heating, changes in price more adversely affect the poor. In 
the contexts of South Africa and Mexico, the structure of the energy market is especially 
damaging to low-income citizens. The electricity and energy markets are essentially 
monopolies, and the energy sources are very carbon-intensive, especially in South Africa.193 
Thus, the monopolies would incur added carbon taxation costs, and in absence of significant 
competitor, these energy companies will pass on these new costs to their customers, 
affecting their lowest income customers most significantly. 
 In places with GINI coefficients hovering around 50 and going as high as 65, 
implementing a regressive tax, no matter how well intentioned, raises significant questions 
about social justice. Climate change may affect the poor disproportionately, especially in 
South Africa and Mexico, but its solutions should not add insult to injury. Because of these 
attributes of socio-economic structure, South Africa, Mexico, and any other country with 
significant poverty challenges, must consider different policy options for the carbon tax. A 
carbon tax policy that privileges greenhouse gas reductions over reductions in inequality, 
and that prioritizes the preferences of businesses over the needs of the poor is ethically 
dubious. Thus, routes to a carbon tax policy should be designed so that the goals of 
greenhouse gas reductions, addressing income inequality, the plight of the poor, and 
minimizing effects on the economy at large. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
192 Hsu, The Case for a Carbon Tax. 124 
193 Mexico’s energy reform is likely to change the structure of the domestic market, but such an extreme re-
structuring may take years to have any effect on customers. 
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The use of the revenues of the carbon tax is particularly interesting from a 
perspective of effects on equity. Tax exemptions for the poor would be a possible option, but 
as both the carbon taxes in South Africa and in Mexico are imposed at the point of sale of 
fossil fuels, such an exemption would probably happen in the form of a tax return or 
decrease in income tax for the lowest brackets. Thus, as the carbon taxes are constructed, it 
would be logistically difficult to address equity concerns without first collecting revenue.  
Developed Country Precedent 
What are the characteristics of carbon taxes in the developed countries that pioneered 
this policy? As evidenced in table A.1 from the appendix, carbon taxes in the developed 
world are most frequently accompanied by tax breaks. Many of these tax cuts are aimed at 
reducing the impact on the lowest income groups, through mechanisms such as reductions in 
income taxes, payments or tax rebates to households, and reductions in individual employee 
social security payments. Others focus on minimizing the effects on businesses; this group 
of tax cuts is more varied. The most common form of revenue recycling to benefit business 
is reductions in employer payments for social security. Some governments, like Australia 
and Japan, also designed the tax so that revenues would help businesses with energy 
efficiency and carbon emissions reductions.  
 Although some revenue recycling in developed countries was targeted for low-
income households, low-income households in most of these countries have incomes 
multiple times that of the lowest income groups of South Africa and Mexico. For example, 
the income threshold for tax benefits from the Australian carbon tax applied to individuals 
making $23,500 and for families making $27,400 a year. In comparison, the lower limit of 
the 2011 South African national poverty line was $425 USD, and the upper limit of the 
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poverty line was $633 USD, with 45% of the South African population falling under this 
level of extreme poverty.194 Mexico’s poverty line is also considerably lower than that of the 
other countries with carbon taxes at $2,124 USD for those living within cities, and $1,356 
USD for rural citizens.195 In Mexico, 47.5% of the population survives off an income below 
this poverty line.196  
Alternatives for South Africa and Mexico 
In order to understand the different policy options and their effects on middle-
income countries, I return to the van Heerden article mentioned in Chapter Two. It is clear 
that without redistributing the tax revenues to other tax breaks, the carbon tax, had largely 
negative effects on the South African economy, such as reducing overall consumption, 
raising production costs, increasing prices, and also encouraging development of alternative 
energy sources. His analysis systematically reviews three different revenue-recycling 
methods: decreases in income taxes among all brackets, an indirect break on taxes like the 
value added tax and the sales tax, and a decrease in the food tax. As mentioned before, the 
authors found that a carbon tax, if revenues were appropriately recycled, could indeed 
achieve a “triple dividend,” a decrease in carbon emissions, an increase in GDP, and a 
decrease in poverty.197 Revenue recycling through a break in income tax, the most common 
revenue recycling method of the wealthier countries, did decrease emissions somewhat, but 
these reductions in emissions were also accompanied by a reduction in GDP and increase in 
poverty. The indirect tax break had a similar effect. The food tax break however, yielded a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
194 "Poverty Trends in South Africa: An Examination of Absolute Poverty between 2006 and 2011,"  (Pretoria, 
South Africa: Statistics South Africa, 2014). need to explain how the different national poverty lines are 
calculated 
195 Cristopher Wilson, "Mexico's Latest Poverty Stats," ed. Gerardo Silva (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson 
International Center for Scholars, 2013). 2 
196 Ibid. 3. 
197 van Heerden, "Searching for Triple Dividends in South Africa: Fighting Co2 Pollution and Poverty While 
Promoting Growth." 
! 110!
triple dividend of greater decreases in carbon emissions than the other options, increase in 
GDP, and decrease in poverty. This is likely because any food tax is even more regressive 
than a carbon tax (which, as previously mentioned, is essentially an energy tax in South 




People in the lowest income decile of South Africa spend around on third of their 
income on food, and only 6% energy. Even among the average of women and men, they 
spend 17.1% and 11.1% of the income on food (respectively) compared to 3.2% and 2.4% 
on energy (respectively). However, looking at just the poorest groups and even national 
averages of percentage of income spent on food versus percentage of income spent on 
energy doesn’t tell the whole story. Energy use by South African varies with income. Poor, 
rural blacks for example are more likely to use biofuels (firewood and animal dung) than are !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
198 "'You Can't Eat Electricity:' Why Tackling Inequality and Hunger Should Be at the Heart of Low Carbon 
Development in  South Africa." 
Table 4.2: Proportion of income spent of on food and electricity by selected 
demographic groups 
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wealthy urban whites.199 However, regardless of income level, race, or gender, South 
Africans tend to spend more on food than energy, and food taxes are clearly, even more 
regressive than carbon or energy taxes. 
In a simulation of revenue neutrality through decrease in manufacturing taxes (more 
or less equivalent to a decrease in indirect taxes in the van Heerden study) versus an increase 
in food subsidies (with the similar effect of reducing food prices as the food tax break in the 
van Heerden study) Gonzalez found for Mexico, similar results as van Heerden found for 
South Africa. The food subsidy yielded optimal results because it had a positive effect on 
equity, unlike the manufactured goods tax break, and also yielded greater reductions in 
greenhouse gases than the manufactured goods tax break.200 This is because the welfare 
impacts of a manufactured goods subsidy are more concentrated in the upper income groups, 
whereas a subsidy on food has a very progressive effect. Also, because a reduction in price 
of a manufacturing good will increase demand for it, and manufactured goods consumed by 
most middle-income Mexicans, have high-embodied carbon.201 Thus, with a carbon tax in 
Mexico, again there does not seem to be a trade-off between equity and efficiency. 
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199 "'You Can't Eat Electricity:' Why Tackling Inequality and Hunger Should Be at the Heart of Low Carbon 
Development in  South Africa.” 






Carbon Market Bell Curve 
Interestingly, Mexican scholars have demonstrated that carbon taxes in Mexico 
would have a sort of bell-curve impact on different income groups.203 This builds off or 
research done on the ideal gas tax level in Mexico.204 Only 9% of households in the poorest 
decile of Mexico require use of liquid fuel, because they might not own cars, or they might 
not even have access to liquid fuels.205 In fact, the second highest income decile is the 
income bracket that spends the highest percentage of their household expenditures on 
gasoline (Figure 4.1). However, a carbon tax affects more than just gasoline. As 99% of the 
overall population, and even 97% of the rural population, which can serve as a proxy for the 
poor population as there are extreme regional, urban-rural income disparities in Mexico, of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
202 Antón, "Optimal Gasoline Tax in Developing Oil-Producing Countries: The Case of Mexico." 
203 Gonzalez, "Distributional Effets of Carbon Taxes: The Case of Mexico." 
204 Antón, "Optimal Gasoline Tax in Developing Oil-Producing Countries: The Case of Mexico." 
205 Ibid. 
Figure 4.1: Percentage of household expenditures spent on gasoline (incidence) by income 
decile in Mexico. 
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Mexico have access to electricity, the effects of increases in electrical bills will probably be 
more acute on low-income people than increases in gas taxes. Gonzalez in his study of the 
carbon tax demonstrated that the most affected groups would be the middle income ones, 
because the lowest income groups in Mexico are too poor to consume much in the way of 
fossil fuels or electricity, middle income groups (third and fourth quintile) consume more 
energy intensive goods, and the highest income groups, even though they consume the most, 
consume more low-energy goods than all other groups, and actually benefit from the hike in 
property values that would occur with a carbon tax.  
Presumably, a carbon tax in South Africa might also have the same effect. Poverty is 
more extreme there, and disparities between rural and urban electricity is much more 
pronounced than in Mexico. Thus, ability to use fossil fuels is possibly even more limited 
for the lowest income groups. After all, 15.6% of South Africa’s households use wood and 
animal dung as their primary heating energy source, two fuels not taxed under the carbon 
tax. 206 The difference between average access to electricity and rural access to electricity is 
more extreme in South Africa than in Mexico. Around 83% of South Africans have access 
to electricity, but only 64% of rural South Africans, compared with 94% of urban South 
Africans, have electricity access (Table 4.3). Because wealth in South Africa is also 
generally concentrated in urban areas, these numbers illustrate persisting inequalities in 
access to energy, which might paradoxically leave the poorest populations less vulnerable to 




206 "Energy Usage Infographic: For Cooking," ed. Census 2011 (Pretoria, South Africa2011). 
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Country Name Access to Energy Type % Of 2010 Population 
Mexico Electricity 99.2 
South Africa Electricity 82.7 
Mexico Electricity, rural 97.5 
South Africa Electricity, rural 64.1 
Mexico Electricity, urban 99.7 
South Africa Electricity, urban 94.3 
Mexico Non-solid fuel 86.1 
South Africa Non-solid fuel 84.9 
Mexico Non-solid fuel, rural 61.0 
South Africa Non-solid fuel, rural 63 
 
207 
Even though the carbon tax is unlikely to affect the extreme poor, energy is a 
necessary input for those in poverty to move into the middle classes. Making energy more 
expensive puts poverty reduction efforts in serious jeopardy, unless the policy is made to 
counteract the increases in cost of energy with decreases of costs in other areas of the 
economy. Additionally, increases in the costs of energy raise costs of production, which can 
make South African industry less competitive and manufactured goods more expensive, 
which would in turn have an effect on the poor and their ability to move out of poverty.  
Equity Implications of the Carbon tax Proposals 
Given the unique income and energy expenditure structure of the South African and 
Mexican economies, the developed country revenue recycling schemes of reducing income 
tax or employee social security contributions are not likely to have much effect on the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
207 "World Devlelopment Indicators," World Bank, 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselection/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-development-
indicators. 
Table 4.3: Access to electricity and non-sold fuel in South Africa and Mexico by location type. !
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poorest, or even middle-income groups of South Africa or Mexico, as around half of the 
population falls under the poverty line, and probably does not pay taxes or social security 
contributions.  However, swapping out a regressive tax for reductions in another regressive 
tax could potentially leave poor South Africans and Mexicans with a lower tax burden than 
they had before the carbon tax was introduced, giving them more disposable income.  
However, neither of these countries chose to recycle the revenues of their carbon 
taxes through a reduction in food price, be it a tax break or food subsidy. Instead, in Mexico 
the carbon tax simply disappears into the national budget as part of the new revenues 
generated by the fiscal reform. Although the larger “Pacto Para Mexico” package includes 
programs aimed to address social welfare and inequality, it is impossible to determine 
whether or not the carbon tax and its specific revenues are helping the poor or reducing 
income inequality in any way. The carbon tax has been designed in a way that the fossil 
fuels most commonly used by individuals (gasoline diesel, and fuel) as opposed to those 
favored by industry (natural gas, coal and petroleum coke) actually have the highest tax per 
unit of carbon (Table 3.1). 
Although the South African carbon tax details have yet to be articulated in the final 
carbon tax bill to go before the parliament in late 2015, there appears to be a strong 
preference for recycling the tax funds in the form of an electricity tax break. Further, more 
formal economic analysis needs to be done to make more specific conclusions. Yet, based 
on available data, it seems that the electricity tax break is not the optimal option for reducing 
carbon while also reducing inequality. All groups in Table 4.2, including the highest decile 
groups spend a higher proportion of their income on food than on a bundle of energy 
expenditures, of which electricity on represents a part. This disparity is more extreme at 
! 116!
lower levels of the income brackets. Additionally, with 37% of rural South Africans lacking 
access to electricity, this, probably poor, group will not benefit from the revenues of the 
carbon tax.  
The poor in South Africa and Mexico will thus have more barriers to escape 
destitution until the larger economy can transition away from energy dependence on fossil 
fuels. This is an admirable and necessary goal for mitigating climate change, but poor 
people at the individual level are not the decision makers with agency over the carbon 
content of the energy mix of their country. By softening the impact of the carbon tax to 
those businesses, heavy industry, electricity providers, etc. that have enough of an impact on 
energy demand to change the energy paradigm, politicians in South Africa and Mexico 
limited the efficacy of the carbon tax while putting more stress on their citizens.  
 
Poor Politics 
 How do these concerns about poverty and equity relate to the larger question of this 
paper about the politics of carbon taxes? First, we might hope that in democracies, the 
leaders are trying to make fair and ethical decisions for the betterment of the citizens that 
elected them, thus it behooves politicians to have an understanding of the policy tools 
available to them and the trade-offs that come with each one. On a slightly less idealistic 
note, there are also real political consequences for being sensitive to the distributional 
effects of a carbon tax on already highly unequal societies. Consumption taxes like carbon 
taxes have been popular in Latin America because elites have been geographically and 
racially separated from beneficiaries of their social programs, and thus feel little desire to 
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fund these programs through direct and progressive taxation.208 They also can yield political 
instability. Dramatic increases in energy costs could lead to protests by the urban middle 
class that will be most affected by these changes. This is a group of people that politicians in 
developing nations tend to avoid aggravating at all costs, because they are the easiest to 
mobilize and most likely to escalate to action.209 
 A carbon tax that neglects questions of equity and poverty in South Africa is 
especially politically problematic, given the complicated history the country has had with 
equity and environmentalism, and may demonstrate a concerning development in tax 
politics. During Apartheid, environmental measures primarily took the form of conservation 
efforts. Although nature parks and reserves tend to be an internationally popular idea, in 
South Africa, these parks just became another means by which the Apartheid government 
displaced local people form their traditional lands and practices, this time under the guise of 
preserving a wilderness “untouched” by man. Apartheid also ensured that electricity and 
energy access was not equal among races.  Electricity lines and distribution systematically 
excluded poor blacks from access to energy, decreasing their chances for economic 
advancement, and reinforcing the inequalities between whites and blacks. The carbon tax, as 
it is currently written, could very well have the effect of favoring business elites, while 
creating barriers for social mobility for the darker skinned poor and middle classes, under 
the guise of an environmental measure initiated by elites. In other words, a carbon tax could 
be reminiscent of Apartheid policies by hurting the economic opportunity of blacks in the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
208 Mahon, "Causes of Tax Reform in Latin America, 1977-95." 23. 
209 Bates, “Introduction,” “Policies toward Cash Crops for Export,” and “Rural Demobilization” in Markets and 
States in Tropical Africa (1981), pp. 1-8, 11-29, 108-113 [ER] 
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name of “protecting the environment,” as Apartheid conservation policies did, and of 
reinforcing inequality of energy access to poor blacks, like the Apartheid energy policies.  
Paradoxically, this also has the troubling result of reversing perhaps the only positive 
leftover of the Apartheid government: its progressive tax structure. As explained in the 
introduction, because only whites received social services from the government, white elites 
were willing to stomach progressive taxes, knowing that only people of their own race 
would benefit. Thankfully, in the post-Apartheid government, no such assurance exists. 
However, the behavior of the South African government in initiating the carbon tax suggests 
new coalition formation based on class. Elites in the DEA and Treasury, who stand to gain 
professionally by implementing a carbon tax, shelter the business elites from its effects 
while leaving members of the poor and middle classes vulnerable. It is outside the scope of 
this paper to demonstrate whether or not class-based coalition making has truly taken force 
in climate and taxation politics. Nonetheless, this carbon tax places the poor payers at odds 
with the wealthy beneficiaries, and may yield political instability and certainly ethical 
concerns.  
 Although Mexico does not have the same stain on its recent history as South Africa 
does, there is considerable potential for political backlash. The ruling party for over 70 years 
has been voted out of the presidency before, and the Mexican public is certainly capable of 
voting them out again. With the wide-scale discontent of the Nieto administration’s response 
to disappearances, including the disappearance of 43 students, and ongoing frustration with 
violence related to the drug trade, politicians will want to avoid policies with 
disproportionate effects on the urban middle and poorer classes. Increasing energy prices 
through the carbon tax without a plan for mitigating the tax’s effects on poverty and equity 
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will probably not improve the political standing of PRI. Because the carbon tax fits within   
the traditional Latin American taxation focus on consumption tax, and again, elites benefit 
reputationally from the carbon tax, it suggests a similar pattern of taxation allegiances 
among the urban elites.210 Thus, part of the carbon tax’s political permissibility is a result of 
a taxation status quo built off of injustice. 
 
Ethical Implications: the Present Poor vs. Future Generations 
 In this last section, I will lay some of the framework with which we can begin to 
consider the social justice issues that raised by South Africa’s and Mexico’s carbon taxes as 
they are currently written. This is only a preliminary exploration, and much more focus 
needs to be brought to this aspect of climate justice in order to come to any semblance of a 
solution. 
Thus far, all of the stakeholders considered in my analysis are those living in the 
present, but with climate change, there are also future stakeholders to take into account. 
Climate justice literature not only concerns the present poor, who are more vulnerable to 
climate change, but also those future generations who will suffer the most if climate change 
proceeds in a business as usual scenario. Climate justice, as activists that brandish its banner 
know it, has become the fusion of “ ‘green’ and ‘red’ (or in the US, blue-green) politics,” 
bringing together environmentalism, social justice, and anti-capitalist thought.211 However, 
climate justice, as the more prominent ethicists in the field conceive it, has much more to do 
with the valuation of the rights of future persons. In neither the social movement nor the 
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210 Patrick Bond, "Politics of Climate Justice: Paralysis above, Movement Below," (Jinju, South Korea: 
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ethical approach do scholars of climate justice deal with the conundrum that may be posed 
by a specific in which the interests of future persons and the present impoverished are 
incompatible. As van Heerden and others have demonstrated, there is a way to implement 
carbon taxes such that they decrease carbon emissions, thereby respecting the rights of 
future persons to a livable climate, and to diminish income inequality, thus respecting the 
rights of the present impoverished. Such a tax is not yet reality.  
 This goes back to a fundamental conundrum, whose responsibility is it to address 
climate change? Is it that of the developed nations, who in partial ignorance filled our 
atmosphere with CO2, or the states currently contributing most to the problem?212 Ethicists 
disagree on the details, but there is a “fairly broad consensus among philosophers and … the 
majority of the climate policy community that efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emission… 
should not harm the ability of poor countries to grow economically and to reduce… the 
widespread poverty their citizens suffer.”213 As previously mentioned, philosophers do not 
tend to publish papers on the justice of specific policies.214 Rather, they are more likely to be 
critical of suites of policies, such as offsets like the CDM, branding them as the “selling of 
indulgences” because they allow large developed nations to pay their way out of actually 
reducing their own emissions.215 These do not offer great examples of precedence that can be 
applied to the moral conundrum of the South African and Mexican carbon taxes, as they still 
focus on the necessity of developed nations to bare the majority of the responsibility.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
212 Stephen M. Gardineir, "Ethics and Global Climate Change: Introductory Overview," in Climate Ethics: 
Essential Readings, ed. Stephen M. Gardiner (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010). 19. 
213 Paul Baer, "Greenhouse Development Rights: A Framework for Climate Protection That Is "More Fair" 
Than Equal Per Capita Emissions Rights," in Climate Ethics: Essential Readings, ed. Stephen M. Gardiner 
(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010). 215. 
214 Lawrence Simon, 28 April 2015. 
215 Bond, "Politics of Climate Justice: Paralysis above, Movement Below." 2. Robert E. Goodin, "Selling 
Environemtnal Indulgences," in Climate Ethics: Essential Readings, ed. Stephen M. Gardineir (Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press, 2010). 231. 
! 121!
Developing nations are moving on their own, perhaps because government officials 
wish to improve their reputations, increase the country’s ability to access development 
funds, and to offer more leverage over climate mitigations so that their current poor and 
future citizens are not as adversely affected as they would be in a business as usual 
circumstance. Be the motivation selfish or altruistic, moral or political, they are taking 
action. No matter what the most extreme advocate of differentiated but shared 
responsibilities may say, it is clear that developing countries cannot proceed with their own 
“business as usual” if climate change is to be effectively mitigated. Thus, there is virtue to 
the actions taken by South Africa and Mexico. While the individual contributions of their 
carbon taxes may be currently quite minimal, once the tax is in place they may be able to 
increase the price of carbon, and thus more aggressively decrease emissions. Perhaps more 
importantly, they are putting the pressure on other states to take similar policies. Although 
Chile is hardly a developing state, it is a non-Annex I party to the Kyoto Protocol and has a 
long history of inequality, colonial oppression, and economic difficulties. Its carbon tax, 
passed in September of 2015 and scheduled for implementation in 2018, was likely made 
possible by the pioneering efforts of South Africa and Mexico in passing their carbon taxes. 
Now, there is very strong pressure on Brazil to pass a carbon tax should it wish to maintain 
any reputation of environmental responsibility with three of its competitor states enacting 
this legislation. Any action that can be made to help Brazil cut down on its emissions, and to 
bring about action among the highly polluting middle income states, is key if we are to take 
the rights of future generations seriously.  
At the same time, for all of the aforementioned reasons, the carbon tax as it currently 
exists in these countries is rife with problems and does not respect the rights of the present 
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poor to be able to elevate themselves out of destitute poverty or the rights of the moderately 
poor to afford energy that is so necessary for keeping them at a reasonable standard of 
living. Thus we have rights of groups at odds with each other. One might attempt a 
utilitarian approach to overcome this impasse.216 Much of the utilitarian calculation depends 
on the rate at which the happiness of future persons is discounted. As there are so many 
more future persons than present South African and Mexican poor, the utilitarian calculation 
will inherently favor the future persons, and make the carbon taxes, as they are, morally 
superior to no carbon tax. 
Such a calculation does not take into account history and the compounded injustices 
that the present poor in these two countries face. Those who are most poor and vulnerable to 
the carbon tax have many other markers that make these people marginalized and 
disadvantaged. Ironically, the poor in these countries, like the poor in any other developing 
state, are more susceptible to disasters and larger trends of weather pattern changes than the 
elite policy makers who enacted the carbon tax. The poor are also overwhelmingly people 
who have faced historical racism. Africans in South Africa, and people of Indigenous 
American and African descent in Mexico make up the lower classes and thus will be the 
most adversely affected by carbon taxation. Further, impairing the ability of the poor to 
move out of abject poverty and to sustain a livable lifestyle in the present, may ensure that 
their descendants are also poor, thus harming future generations. 
Of course, the levels of taxation are currently so low that these specific taxes may 
not have significant impacts on future generations or even the present poor. However, if 




still protecting large business interests at the expense of the poor, this moral dilemma may 
become a significant factor of the future of climate legislation. People uninterested in justice 
do not advocate for carbon taxes. The policy puts a price on something that has always been 
free – carbon emissions – for the sake of the common good. Yet, if a carbon tax that respects 
both the rights of the present poor and the future generations (one that would recycle 
revenue through a food affordability program) is not a political possibility, policymakers, 
activists, and scholars have to make an informed decision about whose rights are sacrificed, 




 As climate change marches forward, and the contribution of developing countries to 
the CO2 levels in the atmosphere grows, it is tempting to blindly laud all climate governance 
advances made in the global south. However, studies like this that look into the sausage 
factory of how the carbon tax went from obscure radical suggestion to established policy are 
important for the success of climate governance.  Understanding how the carbon taxes made 
it to the political mainstream and how interest groups shaped them into the forms they have 
taken allows scholars and policymakers to assess how the priorities of those in power will 
manifest them selves in the actual effects of the policy. There are no studies suggesting that 
making natural gas exempt from Mexico’s carbon tax, or providing exporting, energy 
intensive industry with up to 80% exemption from the South African carbon tax will help 
domestic GDP. Simply sending the Mexican carbon tax revenues into the general budget, or 
using the South African carbon tax revenues to eliminate the electricity tax does not ensure 
that the money generated by the carbon tax will imxprove conditions of poverty. It is 
commendable that the bureaucrats and politicians of these countries are willing to take on 
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the risks of being early movers, and there is evidence to suggest that a carbon tax can 
achieve the triple dividends of decreasing emissions, increasing GDP, and decreasing 
inequality, so long as revenues are allocated in a way that directly helps the poor, such as 
food assistance programs.  
 There is clearly policy momentum for a carbon tax in non-Annex I countries. Chile 
passed its own carbon tax in September 2015, and Brazil and China are openly considering a 
carbon tax of their own.217 It would behoove these states to learn the lessons of South Africa 
and Mexico and for South Africa and Mexico to learn from their own mistakes. Laws can 
change. The carbon tax for Mexico was passed alongside with sweeping reforms that 
improve social services. All the government has to do to demonstrate to different countries 
and to their own people that energy is now a bit more expensive, but for just cause, is to 
specifically allocate the carbon tax to fund social services, especially those related to 
poverty alleviation. South Africa has an even greater opportunity. At the end of this year, 
they will be writing the law as it will be enacted in 2016. Rather than blindly follow the 
trajectory it has taken, South Africa can develop a truly innovative and progressive carbon 
tax by using revenues for poverty alleviation. Such thoughtful and ethical policy making is 
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Year of 
Implementation 
Countries % Of national 
emissions 
covered 




Revenue Distribution Tax rate in USD 
1990 Finland F: 15% 
 
Consumers of fossil 
fuels except electricity, 
commercial planes and 
boats 
 
$750 million Government budget; 
Accompanied by separate 
income tax cuts, reductions 
employer’s social security 
contributions (SSC)1 
$35 / t CO2 
Netherlands -- -- $4.8 billion Income tax cut; reductions in 
employer’s SCC; corporate tax 
cut; climate change mitigation2 
~$20 / t CO2 
1991 Norway N: 50% 
 
All consumption of 
mineral oil, gasoline, 
natural gas 
$900 million Government budget, income 
tax reductions 
$4-69 / t CO2 
 
Sweden 25% All fossil fuels used for 
motor fuels and heating 
$3.7 billion Government budget; Income 
tax reductions; employee SSC 
reductions 
$168 / t CO2 
1992 Denmark 45% Oil gas and electricity $905 million  Environmental subsidies 
(40%); income tax reductions 
employers SSC reductions 
(60%) 
$31 / t CO2 
1997 Costa Rica* -- Sale of all hydro-
carbons 
-- Sustainable development 
incentives for landowners3 
3.5% tax on sale 
of all 
hydrocarbon fuels 
2008 Switzerland 30% Fossil fuels for heating 
and lighting 
$736 Million4 1/3 energy efficiency support; 
2/3 Tax breaks 





5 "Carbon and Energy Taxes (Finland),"  
6 "Selected Carbon Tax Approaches: A Survey," Concensus Building Institute, 
http://www.cbuilding.org/sites/default/files/1stRT_4.0_Carbon_tax_rate_table.pdf. 
7 Jeremy Carl, "Revenue-Neutral Carbon Taxes in the Real World: Insigths from British Columbia and Austrailia " in Task Force on Energy Policy, ed. David 
Fedor (Palo Alto, California: Hoover Institution Stanford University). 
8 "Carbon Tax (Tax for Climate Change Mitigation)," Ministry of the Environment, http://www.env.go.jp/en/policy/tax/env-tax/20120814b_ct.pdf. 
2010 Iceland 50% Gas oil, diesel, gasoline, 
heavy fuel petroleum, 
gas petroleum and other 
gaseous hydro carbons 
$28 Million5 Government Budget6 $10/ t CO2 
 
Ireland -- All consumers of natural 
gas and mineral oil 
-- Government budget $20 / t CO2 
2012 Australia**  60% 
 
All large emitters from 
major industries 
$6.7 billion 50% to income tax breaks and 
payments to households; 40% 
to emissions reductions 
programs for business7 
A: $24 / t CO2 
 
 
Japan 70% All fossil fuel use w/ 
exceptions for  
$3.3 billion Renewable energy and energy 
efficiency programs8 
 $2 / t CO2 




Employer SSC reductions $15.75 / t CO2 
2014 
Mexico: Passed 2013 
France  35% 
 
 Natural gas, oil, heavy 
oil not already covered 
by EU ETS 
-- Renewable Energy R&D  $10 / tCO2 
 
Mexico 40% Fossil fuel sales and 
import by manufacturers 
-- Government budget $1-$4 per t CO2 
depending on fuel 
type 
2016 (passed 2012) South Africa 60% All stationary direct 
GHG emissions 
-- Reductions in electricity levy 
(planned) 
$12 / t CO2 
 
2018 (passed 2014) Chile -- Operators of boilers and 
turbines with a > 50 
MW capacity 








226 "South Africa". 
227 "Mexico," US Energy Information Administration. 
Figure A.1: Total primary energy consumption in South Africa 2012. Excludes 
biomass. !
Figure A.2: Mexico’s 2012 energy consumption by type  
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